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Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, 511 S.W.3d 845 (per curiam).”
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BARNES FOOTNOTE
Effective March 2, 2017, the Arkansas Court of Appeals will assume appellate jurisdiction of all appeals arising from a petitioner’s allegation
that the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial or on
direct appeal from a judgment of conviction except in instances when the
death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed on the petitioner.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals will also assume jurisdiction of petitions
for post-conviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 in cases wherein the Rule required the petitioner in cases
where the judgment was entered before July 1, 1989, to obtain permission from the appellate court before proceeding in the trial court with a
petition under the Rule.1

In an otherwise unremarkable published opinion, Barnes v. State,2 the
Arkansas Supreme Court summarily changed the appellate process in the
state’s postconviction process that may afford relief in some criminal cases.3
It directed that appeals in actions involving postconviction attacks on convictions or sentences pursuant to Arkansas Rule Criminal Procedure 37.14
based on claims of ineffective assistance rendered by defense counsel will
be heard in the future by the Arkansas Court of Appeals,5 rather than the
1. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1. The court issued
the opinion in Barnes on March 2, 2017.
2. 2017 Ark. 76, 511 S.W.3d 845.
3. See In re Review of Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 313 Ark. 168, 852 S.W.2d 791
(1993), where the state supreme court clarified its position on review of habeas corpus actions, announcing that following its decision, review would be by appeal, rather than by petition for writ of certiorari, addressing conflicting decisions previously rendered by the court.
Certain specific challenges, such as denial of reasonable bail, continue to be brought by certiorari. Thomas v. State, 260 Ark. 512, 542 S.W.2d 284 (1976).
4. An Arkansas defendant challenging the legality of the sentence imposed, or by implication, the underlying conviction, “may file a petition in the court that imposed the sentence, praying that the sentence be vacated or corrected.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(a). Arkansas
Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1(a) provides:
(a) A petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court claiming a right to be
released, or to have a new trial, or to have the original sentence modified on the
ground:
(i) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States or this state; or
(ii) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or
(iii) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law;
or
(iv) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack; may file a petition
in the court that imposed the sentence, praying that the sentence be vacated or
corrected.
5. For a brief history of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, see Court of Appeals, ARK.
JUDICIARY, https://www.arcourts.gov/courts/court-of-appeals (last visited Sept. 6, 2017); see
also Josephine Linker Hart & Guilford M. Dudley, The Unpublished Rules of the Arkansas
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state supreme court, except in cases in which a death sentence or sentence of
life imprisonment was imposed at trial.6 In this single footnote, the state
supreme court redirected substantial responsibility for appellate review of
cases rooted in the criminal trial process and did so leaving the precise parameters of the realignment of appellate jurisdiction vague. The change in
appellate jurisdiction has significant consequences for Arkansas litigants
and implicates an unresolved constitutional issue regarding the independent
authority of the states to tailor their discrete appellate systems within the
federalized judicial system.7
In Barnes, the trial court of conviction dismissed the action based on
the petitioner’s failure to comply with the requirement for personal verification of the petition’s contents. The verification requirement, an express requirement under the rules, is explained as necessary to prevent falsification
of claims by inmates8 filing pro se.9
Court of Appeals: The Internal Rules and Procedures of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, 33
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 109 (2011). Justice Hart now sits on the Supreme Court of
Arkansas. Associate Justice Josephine L. Hart, Position 4, ARK. JUDICIARY,
https://www.arcourts.gov/courts/supreme-court/justices/associate-justice-josephine-l-hartposition-4 (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
6. Barnes, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d at 846. The reservation of initial appellate jurisdiction over Rule 37.1 appeals in which a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed at trial by the supreme court is consistent with its jurisdiction on the direct appeal. See
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a) (“All cases appealed shall be filed in the Court of Appeals except that
the following cases shall be filed in the Supreme Court: . . . 2. Criminal appeals in which the
death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed.”). Because the supreme court has jurisdiction over cases in which a life sentence is imposed, it has jurisdiction over subsequent
appeals in cases arising from the same prosecution under Rule 1-2(a)7.
7. In the context of the criminal process, the nation works under a federalized judicial
system because both federal and state courts have jurisdiction over criminal matters as a
result of the operation of federal and state criminal statutes, sometimes regulating the same
conduct. E.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857-60 (2014) (discussing propriety of
apparent overlap of state offenses and federal criminal offenses grounded in regulation of
interstate commerce). In the postconviction context, the federalized judicial system is reflected in the review afforded state court determinations on claimed violations of procedural
rights protected under the federal constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the certiorari process, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and in the federal habeas corpus process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018). In Long, the Court observed:
The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in this country. In
1982, more than twelve million criminal actions (excluding juvenile and traffic
charges) were filed in the 50 state court systems and the District of Columbia. By
comparison, approximately 32,700 criminal suits were filed in federal courts during that same year. The state courts are required to apply federal constitutional
standards, and they necessarily create a considerable body of “federal law” in the
process.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1042 n.8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
8. The reference to “inmates” is intentional. An individual in custody as a consequence
of a felony conviction has standing to bring an action for postconviction relief pursuant to
Rule 37. But, postconviction relief under Rule 37 is not available to a convicted defendant
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On appeal, the supreme court upheld the circuit court’s dismissal of the
Rule 37.1 petition, dismissing Barnes’s appeal.10 The dismissal in the trial
court resulted from the defendant’s attempt to withdraw his plea, by motion,
following his conviction on a guilty plea to four felonies with his punishment set at 240 months imprisonment.11 The trial court construed the posttrial motion to “retract” the guilty plea12 as a Rule 37.1 petition,13 and the
unless the petitioner is actually in custody at the time of filing the petition. Scott v. State, No.
CR 05-351, 2006 WL 302351, at *1 (Ark. Feb. 9, 2006); Bohannon v. State, 336 Ark. 367,
372, 985 S.W.2d 708, 710 (1999). The Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently held that in
order to pursue relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure—
the primary route for collateral attack on a conviction under Arkansas law—the petitioner
must be incarcerated at the time of filing the petition. Scott, 2006 WL 302351, at *2; Bohannon, 336 Ark. at 372, 985 S.W.2d at 710. The state court has expressly rejected reliance on
the more expansive understanding and treatment of the “in custody” requirement applied by
federal courts in postconviction proceedings. Bohannon, 336 Ark. at 372, 985 S.W.2d at 710
(parolee not “in custody” for purposes of postconviction litigation under Rule 37); Kemp v.
State, 330 Ark. 757, 758, 956 S.W.2d 860, 861 (1997) (holding that a defendant sentenced
only to pay fine is not eligible for postconviction relief).
9. E.g., Nelson v. State, 363 Ark. 306, 306, 213 S.W.3d 645, 646 (2005); Boyle v.
State, 362 Ark. 248, 250–51, 208 S.W.3d 134, 136 (2005). The verification requirement has
also been applied to dismiss petitions filed by counsel representing inmates on behalf of a
petitioner. In Walker v. Norris, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district
court’s deference to state court dismissal of the petitioner’s unverified Rule 37 petition, despite evidence that it had applied this remedy inconsistently in appeals from Rule 37 dismissals. 436 F.3d 1026, 1031–33 (8th Cir. 2006). The petitioner’s attorney had signed the petition, rather than the petitioner personally executing a separate verification. Id. at 1032. The
Eighth Circuit found that the state postconviction petition was not properly filed as a consequence and did not toll the time for filing the federal petition, and therefore the petition was
dismissed as not timely filed. Id. at 1032–33. Thus, verification remains a critical technical
requirement for the consideration of the petitioner’s postconviction claims for relief. In
Wooten v. State, however, the court applied an exception to the mandatory requirement that
the petitioner verify the petition personally in cases in which a death sentence had been imposed, permitting correction of the error without dismissal of the Rule 37.5 petition. 2010
Ark. 467, 370 S.W.3d 475.
10. Barnes, 2017 Ark. 76, at 2, 511 S.W.3d at 846. The court explained its rationale for
dismissing the appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of the pending postconviction action:
We dismiss the appeal because it is evident from the record that Barnes could not succeed on
appeal. This court will not permit an appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. The motions
are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal.
Id. at 2, 511 S.W.3d at 846 (citation omitted).
11. Id. at 1, 511 S.W.3d at 845. The defendant styled his motion as one to “retract” his
guilty plea, perhaps attempting to circumvent Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1(a),
which provides that once a judgment is entered on the record of the conviction, the trial court
loses jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
12. A defendant convicted upon a guilty plea may move to withdraw the plea under
certain circumstances, including an allegation that counsel provided ineffective assistance if
necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 26.1(b)(1).
13. With respect to ineffective assistance claims challenging counsel’s representation in
advising the defendant who pleads guilty, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held “[i]t must be
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state supreme court upheld the trial court’s disposition under its prior decisions.14
II. THE SKIRMISH
Quite apart from the per curiam disposition of the appeal in Barnes, the
supreme court chose to announce the change in appellate jurisdiction in a
footnote to the Barnes opinion. The court’s language could be misleading
because the change in jurisdiction appears limited to appeals involving
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than in referencing all
appeals from Rule 37.1 actions.15 The respective jurisdictional limits of the
state supreme court and court of appeals are set out in the Arkansas Rules of
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule 1-2,16 as adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court. With the creation of the Arkansas Court of Appeals
by constitutional amendment in 1979, the supreme court was given authority
to determine jurisdiction of the respective appellate courts:
The General Assembly is hereby empowered to create and establish a
Court of Appeals and divisions thereof. The Court of Appeals shall have
remembered that on appeal from the denial of a Rule 37 petition following pleas of guilty
there are only two issues for review—one, whether the plea of guilty was intelligently and
voluntarily entered, two, were the pleas made on the advice of competent counsel.” Branham
v. State, 292 Ark. 355, 357, 730 S.W.2d 226, 227 (1987); see also Bryant v. State, 323 Ark.
130, 131–32, 913 S.W.2d 257, 258 (1996).
14. Barnes, 2017 Ark. 76, at 2, 511 S.W.3d at 845 (citing Bailey v. State, 312 Ark. 180,
182, 848 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1993) (per curiam); Millsap v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 406, at 2, 2016
WL 6803694, at *2 (per curiam)).
15. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1–37.4 (providing for the basic postconviction remedy in Arkansas criminal prosecutions).
16. Rule 1-2 of the rules regarding jurisdiction of the Arkansas appellate courts, adopted
by the state supreme court provides:
(a) Supreme Court Jurisdiction. All cases appealed shall be filed in the Court of
Appeals except that the following cases shall be filed in the Supreme Court:
1. All appeals involving the interpretation or construction of the Constitution of
Arkansas;
2. Criminal appeals in which the death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed;
3. Petitions for quo warranto, prohibition, injunction, or mandamus directed to
the state, county, or municipal officials or to circuit courts;
4. Appeals pertaining to elections and election procedures;
5. Appeals involving the discipline of attorneys-at-law and or arising under the
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law;
6. Appeals involving the discipline and disability of judges;
7. Second or subsequent appeals following an appeal which has been decided in
the Supreme Court; and
8. Appeals required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2.
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such appellate jurisdiction as the Supreme Court shall by rule determine,
and shall be subject to the general superintending control of the Supreme
Court.17

Rule 1-2 has not expressly addressed initial jurisdiction over appeals in actions brought under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1.18
Although Rule 1-2 has not explicitly provided that appeals from trial
court determinations on the merits of claims brought pursuant to Rule 37.1
lie within the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Supreme Court, these appeals
have traditionally been filed in that court.19 Rule 37.3 of the criminal procedure rules does expressly provide, however, that when counsel is appointed
to represent a petitioner in a Rule 37.1 action, the appeal lies with the state
supreme court.20 The Barnes footnote has effectively abrogated this provision in the rule.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals responded to the supreme court’s reassignment of jurisdiction in Barnes with its opinion in Bridgeman v. State,21
an appeal from denial of postconviction relief in a Rule 37.1 action. There,
the court noted, “Before we can address the specific arguments that Bridgeman raises on appeal, we must first address how our court obtained jurisdiction over appeals such as this, which have historically been decided by our
supreme court.”22
The court’s opinion, written by Judge Whiteaker,23 recalled the traditional history of jurisdiction over Rule 37 actions.24 He noted in this instruc17. ARK. CONST. amend. 58, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22(D) (emphasis
added) (legislatively establishing the court of appeals, effective from July 1, 1979 until July
1, 2001 with Amendment 80); see Act of Feb. 23, 1979, No. 208, 1979 Ark. Acts 467. The
amendment was adopted by the voters at the November 7, 1978 election.
18. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1–37.4.
19. See, e.g., Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 1, 303 S.W.3d 55, 57 (“We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 37 and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(8) (2011).”). The
opinion makes no reference to any jurisdictional statement included in Rule 1-2(a)(8) which
would dictate that an appeal from denial of postconviction relief in a Rule 37.1 action lies
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court.
20. Rule 37.3(b) provides, in pertinent part:
If a petition on which the petitioner was represented by counsel is denied, counsel shall continue to represent the petitioner for an appeal to the Supreme Court, unless relieved as counsel by the circuit court or the Supreme Court. If no hearing was held or the petitioner proceeded pro se at the hearing, the circuit court may at its discretion appoint counsel for an
appeal upon proper motion by the petitioner.
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.3(b).
21. 2017 Ark. App. 321, 525 S.W.3d 459.
22. Id. at 1, 525 S.W.3d at 460.
23. Id., 525 S.W.3d at 460. The decision was issued by two panels of the court of appeals, with Chief Justice Gruber and Justices Gladwin, Klappenbach, Vaught, and Brown,
agreeing with Justice Whiteaker. Id. at 10, 525 S.W.3d at 465.
24. Id. at 2, 525 S.W.3d at 461.
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tional discussion that the state supreme court had consistently held, prior to
its decision in Barnes, that review of appeals from denial of postconviction
were “required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court.”25 He referred to
the supreme court’s 2014 decision, Green v. State,26 in which the court noted
that the appellant brought an appeal from denial of postconviction relief to
the supreme court based on Rule 37 and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 12(a)(8),27 which merely provide that the court has jurisdiction over
“[a]ppeals required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court.”28
The Bridgeman court then observed:
On March 2, 2017, however, our supreme court, without effectuating a
rule change and without any explication or further explanation as to why
it was no longer required by law to hear such cases, summarily transferred a majority of its Rule 37 cases to this court by means of a footnote
in an unsigned per curiam opinion. Thus, we exercise jurisdiction over
this appeal pursuant to the authority apparently delegated to us by virtue
of this simple footnote contained in Barnes.29

The court then proceeded to address the question presented by the appeal on
the merits, rejecting his claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly entered
because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to fully advise
him of the sentencing consequences of the plea.30 This claim in the Rule 37
petition clearly fell within the supreme court’s footnote directive in Barnes,
because it addressed trial counsel’s effectiveness in advising his client with
respect to the guilty plea, as noted in the footnote reassigning appellate jurisdiction to the court of appeals.31
However, Bridgeman asserted an alternative theory that was not specifically couched in terms of counsel’s performance. He argued that because
the judgment initially entered in the case did not indicate that he was being
sentenced as a habitual offender, the 15-year sentence imposed on his con25. Id., 525 S.W.3d at 461 (emphasis added).
26. 2014 Ark. 284, 2014 WL 2814866.
27. Id. at 1, 2014 WL 2814866, at *1.
28. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(8).
29. Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 3–4, 525 S.W.3d at 462 (emphasis added) (citing
Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1). The Bridgeman court
observed, “Prior to March 2, 2017, the Arkansas Supreme Court exerted jurisdiction over all
postconviction matters, as it had previously and consistently held that such appeals are ‘required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court’ pursuant to Rule 1-2(a)(8).” Id. at 2, 525
S.W.3d at 462 (emphasis in original) (quoting ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2 (a)(8)) (citing multiple
decisions of Arkansas Supreme Court).
30. Id. at 5–7, 525 S.W.3d at 462–63.
31. Barnes, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d at 846 n.1. Ineffective assistance of
counsel is commonly brought as a violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and litigated pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See
discussion of Strickland infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
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viction—10 years imprisonment with an additional 5 years suspendedexceeded the trial court’s authority since he was convicted of a Class D
felony offense, carrying a sentence range of 0-6 years,32 on a reduced charge
of breaking and entering.33 The imposition of a sentence in excess of the trial
court’s authority under the applicable sentencing statute constitutes jurisdictional error,34 which may be challenged initially on direct appeal35 or in
postconviction without having been preserved by objection at trial.36
The postconviction court ruled, however, that Bridgeman had made a
knowing and voluntary plea of guilty pursuant to an agreement negotiated
by trial counsel and represented his understanding of the plea agreement to
the court during his guilty plea colloquy.37 The court of appeals rejected
Bridgeman’s argument on appeal based on the trial court’s findings, including his admission that he was satisfied with counsel’s performance when he
entered his guilty plea.38
In light of the record, it is not at all remarkable that Bridgman’s postconviction challenges were rejected by both the trial and appellate courts.
But, there is one additional point particularly relevant in light of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s reassignment of appellate jurisdiction for Rule 37 appeals. In the Barnes footnote, the court expressly held that the court of appeals would thereafter have jurisdiction over appeals of postconviction
claims “arising from a petitioner’s allegation that the petitioner was denied
effective assistance of counsel at trial or on direct appeal from a judgment
of conviction.”39 The supreme court did not simply redirect all appeals from
denial of Rule 37.1 relief to the court of appeals, although that is almost
certainly the court’s intent. Rather, the express language in the Barnes footnote only redirects appeals based on ineffective assistance of counsel at trial
or on direct appeal to the court of appeals.40

32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(5) (West 2019).
33. Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 4–5, 525 S.W.3d at 462.
34. Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark. 760, 765, 68 S.W.3d 289, 292 (2002).
35. Donaldson v. State, 370 Ark. 3, 5–6, 257 S.W.3d 74, 76 (2007); Thomas v. State,
349 Ark. 447, 459, 79 S.W.3d 347, 354 (2002).
36. Renshaw v. State, 337 Ark. 494, 498, 989 S.W.2d 515, 517–18 (1999).
37. Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 6–7, 525 S.W.3d at 463.
38. Id. at 8, 525 S.W.3d at 464.
39. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1 (emphasis added).
40. The court of appeals specifically noted that the supreme court had “summarily transferred a majority of its Rule 37 cases to this court by means of a footnote in an unsigned per
curiam opinion.” Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 3–4, 525 S.W.3d at 462. However, in a
post-Barnes opinion, the court of appeals reversed the trial court in a Rule 37.1 appeal in
Kauffeld v. State, to correct a clerical error in the judgment in considering the petitioner’s
claimed violation of the protection afforded by double jeopardy. 2019 Ark. App. 29, at 4, 569
S.W.3d 348, 352.
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Bridgeman did challenge trial counsel’s effectiveness,41 but his other
point in challenging his sentence was directed at the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction in imposing the sentence that had been agreed upon in the negotiated plea. Because the judgment entered by the court did not include the
recitation, or checked box, indicating the he was being sentenced as a habitual offender, he argued that the 15-year sentence, with 5 years suspended,
amounted to a sentence in violation of the trial court’s authority.42 This
claim did not constitute an attack on trial counsel’s performance, or effectiveness, at all. The court of appeals, however, had no difficulty in finding
that the trial court’s correction of the clerical error in the omission of the
reference to his punishment as a habitual offender by amending the judgment and commitment order nunc pro tunc was proper.43 The record of the
plea colloquy effectively rebutted any claimed prejudice from the clerical
error and reflected Bridgeman’s understanding of the plea agreement and his
willingness to forego trial and plead guilty.44
Ultimately, of course, the Arkansas Supreme Court would necessarily
prevail in the skirmish over jurisdiction of Rule 37.1 appeals. As the
Bridgeman court explained, the power to define appellate jurisdiction had
consistently been vested in the Arkansas Supreme Court by the state constitution with approval for creation of the Arkansas Court of Appeals by
amendment in 1978.45 Amendment 80 section 5 of the Arkansas Constitution, adopted pursuant to the 2000 General Election, affirmed the authority
of the supreme court to define the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, expressly providing:
There shall be a Court of Appeals which may have divisions thereof as
established by Supreme Court rule. The Court of Appeals shall have such
appellate jurisdiction as the Supreme Court shall by rule determine and
shall be subject to the general superintending control of the Supreme

41. Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 8–9, 525 S.W.3d at 464.
42. Id. at 5, 525 S.W.3d at 462–63 (“On appeal, Bridgeman challenges the trial court’s
factual findings, argues that his attorney was ineffective for not sufficiently informing him of
the sentencing consequences of his suspended sentence, and asserts that he was convicted of
a crime for which he was never charged.”).
43. Id. at 7, 525 S.W.3d at 463.
44. Id. at 6–7, 525 S.W.3d at 463–64.
45. Id. at 1–2 n.1, 525 S.W.3d at 460–61 n.1. In note 1, the court explained:
Amendment 58, which was approved by voters on November 7, 1978, stated, in
relevant part, “The General Assembly is hereby empowered to create and establish a Court of Appeals and divisions thereof. The Court of Appeals shall have
such appellate jurisdiction as the Supreme Court shall by rule determine, and
shall be subject to the general superintending control of the Supreme Court.”
Id., 525 S.W.3d at 460–61 n.1 (emphasis in original) (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. 58, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22(D)).
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Court. Judges of the Court of Appeals shall have the same qualifications
as Justices of the Supreme Court.46

The recognition by the Bridgeman court of the change in appellate jurisdiction to redirect appeals in Rule 37 postconviction actions in which
ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged, effectively would have ended the
skirmish over the reassignment occasioned by the supreme court’s footnote
in Barnes. However, just over one month later, perhaps stung by Judge
Whiteaker’s criticism of the manner by which the supreme court had altered
appellate jurisdiction over Rule 37.1 appeals, Associate Justice Womack
issued a reply for the majority in an opinion on a wholly unrelated matter in
Mason v. Mason.47
Mason involved the certification of an issue on appeal by the Arkansas
Court of Appeals to the Arkansas Supreme Court.48 The issue concerned
retroactive application of a statute requiring mandatory termination of alimony payments upon a showing that the alimony recipient is “living full
time with another person in an intimate, cohabitating relationship.”49 The
supreme court rejected retroactive application of this provision to an award
of alimony included in a divorce decree issued in 2010,50 remanding the case
for determination of other appellate issues not before the supreme court in
the certified question.51
46. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 5 (emphasis added) (approved by the voters in the November 7, 2000 election).
47. 2017 Ark. 225, 522 S.W.3d 123. The opinion was not unanimous as Chief Justice
Kemp dissented. Id. at 5, 522 S.W.3d at 126.
48. Id. at 1, 522 S.W.3d at 124; see also ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(d). The rule provides for
transfer of a pending case from the court of appeals to the supreme court, in pertinent part:
If the Court of Appeals seeks to transfer a case, the Court of Appeals shall find
and certify that the case: (1) is excepted from its jurisdiction by Rule 1-2(a), or
(2) otherwise involves an issue of significant public interest or a legal principle
of major importance. The Supreme Court may accept for its docket cases so certified or may remand any of them to the Court of Appeals for decision.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(d).
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-312(a)(2)(D) (West 2019).
50. Mason, 2017 Ark. 225, at 2, 522 S.W.3d at 124. Resolution of the retroactivity issue
represented an important ruling under state law, both because it clarified the finality of alimony orders in divorce decrees entered prior to the effective date of the statute, and because
it affords insight into the court’s current review of retroactive application of legislation with
respect to civil law issues. Id. at 1, 522 S.W.3d at 124. Initially, the court explained that retroactive application of new legislation is subject to a clear expression of legislative intent. Id.
at 4, 522 S.W.3d at 125. The majority found that because there was no evidence in the statutory language, neither party arguing to the contrary, there was no basis for concluding that the
General Assembly intended retroactive application of the new provision mandating end of
alimony in the event the recipient subsequently engages in an intimate, cohabitating relationship. Id. at 3–5, 522 S.W.3d at 125–26. The legislation incorrectly said “cohabitating,” rather
than using the correct term, cohabiting. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-312(a)(2)(D).
51. Mason, 2017 Ark. 225, at 2, 522 S.W.3d at 124.
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Mason also includes another point, unrelated to disposition of the retroactivity issue. Again, in a footnote, the majority directly criticized the Arkansas Court of Appeals, complaining of the state of the record on appeal
that the intermediate court forwarded with its certification request.52 The
opinion, this time in a signed opinion, included the supreme court’s reference to the inadequate briefs submitted by counsel for the parties, including
the brief submitted on behalf of the appellant, who nevertheless prevailed on
the certified question.53 The supreme court criticized the briefs:
We note that the briefs the court of appeals certified to us are deficient.
The appellee raised his statutory argument in a motion for summary
judgment. Debra filed a response and Charles filed an additional reply.
The circuit court held a hearing on May 5, 2014, and issued an order on
June 17, 2014, denying the appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
None of the mentioned pleadings, hearings, orders, or briefs and exhibits
are included in the abstract or addendum.54

But the court’s opinion does not simply address the deficiencies in the
briefs submitted by counsel for the respective parties. First, the court explained that it was able to resolve the retroactivity issue without resorting to
the materials not included in the briefs as submitted.55 The supreme court
went further in directing its criticism to the court of appeals:
We remand to the court of appeals to address the briefing deficiencies
and the underlying merits of the case. It is unfortunate that this case was
certified to our court in its current state. We note that with twelve judges,
twenty-four law clerks, and four staff attorneys, the court of appeals has
sufficient resources to spot such deficiencies. In the future, we expect the
court of appeals to ensure that the briefs comply with our rules prior to
certifying a case to this court.56

The court’s comment might not be interpreted as a response to the Bridgeman court’s observations on the reassignment of appellate jurisdiction in
Rule 37.1 appeals to that court. But then again, it would not seem unlikely
that the reader or court observer would characterize it as nothing less than a
direct response reflecting a near-consensus that the intermediate court had
improperly questioned the means by which the reassignment had been announced as well as the supreme court’s motive in redirecting Rule 37.1 ap52. Id. at 2 n.2, 522 S.W.3d at 124 n.2.
53. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 124 n.2.
54. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 124, n.2 (emphasis added). The requirements for the contents of
the abstract and the addendum required for briefs submitted in Arkansas appeals are set forth
in Rule 4-2(a)(5)(A) and (a)(8)(A), respectively, of the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules.
55. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 124 n.2.
56. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 124 n.2 (emphasis added).
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peals or the wisdom of this administrative decision. Finally, the reference in
Mason to the number of judges, law clerks, and attorneys staffing the court
of appeals suggests only that the intermediate court could readily absorb the
shifted caseload. This could simply provide a point of clarification, or it
could reflect the supreme court’s view that the court of appeals should not
be considered to be overworked in terms of its docket and available resources.
Regardless of whether the court of appeals was less than diplomatic in
taking its argument over the reassignment of appellate jurisdiction in Rule
37.1 appeals public by addressing the situation in a published opinion, its
criticism of the state supreme court clearly made its point. The inclusion of
the decision to redirect those appeals raising claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel to the intermediate court in a footnote to an unsigned opinion
seems less formal than appropriate. The supreme court could have accomplished this change by amending Rule 1-2(a) of the rules it is authorized to
promulgate.57 Or, it could have announced the change in an order published
in the official reports now included on the Judiciary website, as it had done
with its order clarifying that appeal, not certiorari, is the proper procedure
for reviewing adverse trial court decisions in habeas corpus actions.58
The supreme court did clearly address its own appellate jurisdiction in
Rule 37 proceedings in the Barnes footnote, providing that appeals from
denials of postconviction relief in cases in which a death sentence or sentence of life imprisonment has been imposed will continue to be heard by
that court, rather than initially being directed to the court of appeals.59 A
significant number of Rule 37 appeals are taken in cases in which the petitioner has been sentenced to life imprisonment, either after trial60 or upon a
plea of guilty.61 The supreme court’s familiarity with those cases may well
57. Bridgeman v. State, 2017 Ark. 321, at 2, 525 S.W.3d 459, 461.
58. See In re Review of Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 313 Ark. 168, 852 S.W.2d 791
(1993).
59. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1 (redirecting appellate review for Rule 37 appeals to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, “except in instances when
the death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed on the petitioner”).
60. E.g. Sykes v. State, 2011 Ark. 412, at 4–6, 2011 WL 4635021, at *2–3 (upholding
trial court’s denial of postconviction relief on claim that trial counsel was ineffective on multiple grounds). The supreme court had previously upheld the conviction and life sentence for
capital murder on direct appeal. Sykes v. State, 2009 Ark. 522, 357 S.W.3d 882.
61. In Sandoval-Vega v. State, the supreme court granted relief on the petitioner’s claim
that the trial court had improperly accepted his plea of guilty to capital murder and imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment before finding that he was competent to enter a plea to the
charge, remanding the case for findings or evidentiary hearing on issue of defendant’s competence. 2011 Ark. 393, at 6–10, 384 S.W.3d 508, 513–15. In Marlin v. State, the defendant
who was charged with capital murder but pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of first
degree murder, attempted to attack his conviction in a Rule 37.1 action. No. CR 03-586, 2003
WL 22145827 (Ark. Sept. 18, 2003). Ultimately, the supreme court held that his postconvic-
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facilitate the review of issues raised in Rule 37.1 appeals because cases involving life sentences are initially heard by that court on direct appeal.62
Having already reviewed the facts and considered the issues raised in
the direct appeal where counsel’s performance at trial would have been evident with respect to claims of defective performance in the record itself, the
supreme court would seem well-positioned to assess the potential prejudice
resulting from a claim of defective performance. Even if counsel’s claimed
deficiency was not apparent in the appellate record but required development in a Rule 37.1 hearing to be fully explained—such as a claim that
counsel failed to investigate the case properly with respect to matters not
raised at trial and, thus, not included in the trial record—the supreme court
would still be well-positioned to evaluate the potential prejudice from counsel’s failure, if any.
Thus, reservation of Rule 37.1 direct appeals in cases involving life
sentences would present no additional burden for the Arkansas Court of
Appeals, while potentially expediting review of postconviction claims by
the supreme court due to its familiarity with the trial record in the case. In
the same general vein, Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(7) provides that jurisdiction on direct appeal will lie in the Arkansas Supreme Court when it has
previously heard the case.63
Moreover, in reality, the number of pro se filings by inmates challenging their convictions or sentences pursuant to the Rule 37.1 remedy is subtion petition was properly dismissed as untimely. Id. at *1. In Fretwell v. State, the defendant
who pleaded guilty to capital murder on advice of counsel and was sentenced to life imprisonment, the supreme court determined that he had suffered ineffective assistance of counsel
and thus it granted postconviction relief, remanding for a new trial. 299 Ark. 306, 307, 722
S.W.2d 334, 334 (1989).
62. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(2) (providing that the supreme court has jurisdiction over
“[c]riminal appeals in which the death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed”).
63. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(7) (providing that the supreme court has jurisdiction over
“[s]econd or subsequent appeals following an appeal which has been decided in the Supreme
Court”). For example, in Buckley v. State, the supreme court remanded for resentencing
where the trial court had improperly admitted hearsay during punishment phase testimony at
trial. 341 Ark. 864, 874–75, 20 S.W.3d 331, 338–39 (2000). The appeal was originally heard
by the supreme court because Buckley’s jury had imposed life sentences on two delivery of
cocaine counts involving less than one-quarter gram of cocaine on each occasion. Id. at 866,
20 S.W.3d at 333. On remand for re-resentencing, the second jury imposed sentences of
twenty-eight years for each count, and Buckley again appealed. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark.
53, 60, 76 S.W.3d 825, 829 (2002). This second appeal was also heard by the supreme court,
which affirmed. Id. at 70–71, 76 S.W.3d at 836. Thereafter, the supreme court heard Buckley’s appeal from denial of relief on his Rule 37.1 petition by the trial court, initially reversing and remanding for evidentiary hearing. Buckley v. State, No. CR 04-554, 2005 WL
1411654, at *3 (Ark. June 16, 2005). Following the hearing, the supreme court denied relief
on Buckley’s appeal. Buckley v. State, No. CR 04-554, 2007 WL 1509323, at *2 (Ark. June
16, 2005). The supreme court heard the appeal from resentencing based upon Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(7).
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stantial,64 many of which undoubtedly fail to comply with the strict formatting requirements for petitions65 and are consequently subject to dismissal
for noncompliance.66 Disposition of pro se filings may not require the expenditure of resources equivalent to, or necessary for the disposition of, civil
and criminal matters in which counsel are involved because of the pro se
petitioner’s failure to comply with the requisite formatting requirements for
the petition;67 failure to verify the petition;68 failure to support a claimed
64. For example, the court explained in its 1987 order referring to Rule 37:
[W]e are being inundated with petitions, mostly from inmates of the Arkansas
Department of Correction, seeking relief under Rule 37. Each petition must be
reviewed and considered, however involved, and most are lengthy and detailed.
We have a fulltime lawyer and secretary serving to handle such petitions and assist the court. We have had to add another part-time lawyer to the staff. All of
this work is related to petitions filed by prisoners. In 1986, 189 such petitions
were filed with written opinions issued in the majority of the cases, usually finding them meritless. They are invariably handwritten, lengthy (a recent one was
100 pages long), and generally attempt to retry the case or attempt to prove their
lawyer incompetent. The three year time limitation in which petitions may be
filed is ignored. Also, the rule that states only one petition may be filed is often
ignored.
In re Rule 37, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 293 Ark. 609, 609, 732 S.W.2d 458, 458 (1987)
(emphasis added).
65. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(b) (including specific margin lengths, at least 1½ inches on
the left and right sides of the page and at least 2 inches at the top and bottom of the page;
number of lines per page, 30; and number of words per line, 15).
66. Id. Section (b) also provides: “The circuit court or appellate court may dismiss any
petition that fails to comply with this subsection.” Id. The rule does not specify whether “appellate court” refers to either the supreme court or court of appeals, but until Barnes, the
supreme court had consistently held that it had jurisdiction to review appeals from circuit
court orders rendered in Rule 37 actions.
67. E.g., White v. State, No. CR 07-312, 2007 WL 2793286 (Ark. Sept. 27, 2007). The
supreme court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the pro se petition and appeal, finding:
Specifically, the court found that appellant’s petition was fourteen pages in
length, exceeded thirty lines per page and did not meet the requirements for left,
right, upper, or lower margins. While the petition contained in the record was
twelve-pages in length rather than fourteen, an examination of the petition contained in the record substantially supports the trial court’s findings.
Id. at *1. The court explained the rationale for enforcing strict compliance with the formatting
requirements for post-conviction petitions:
The restrictions in Rule 37.1 placed upon lines per page, words per line and margins require little more than an ability to count and measure with a ruler. The restrictions are neither burdensome, unduly time-consuming, nor unreasonable, and
appellant has not demonstrated that the court erred in requiring him to comply
with Rule 37.1(b).
Id.
68. Bridgeman v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 2, 511 S.W.3d 846, 846 (citing Keck v. State,
2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240, at *3 (per curiam)). Rule 37.1(d) requires that the
Rule petition be verified by the petitioner. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(d). For additional discussion
of the verification requirement, see supra note 9.
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violation with sufficient legal authority69 or facts70 to warrant relief; or failure to include an abstract of the trial deemed necessary for resolution of the
issues on appeal.71 Nevertheless, regardless of the fact that disposition of
petitions failing for these reasons may appear routine, a panel of the court of
appeals will presumably still be required to consider the appeal from denial
of Rule 37 relief and make the decision to dismiss the petition as meritless
or procedurally defaulted.72
The conclusion of the “skirmish” over reassignment of appellate review of trial court rulings denying relief on Rule 37.1 petitions could hardly
have been in doubt. Regardless of the abruptness of the supreme court’s
announcement of the change in appellate, its order was basically final upon
announcement in Barnes. The court of appeals has accepted its responsibility73 with little objection other than Judge Whiteaker’s comments in
Bridgeman,74 hearing appeals and upholding trial court decisions denying
relief.75
69. E.g., Polivka v. State, 2010 Ark. 152, at 14–15, 362 S.W.3d 918, 928 (“Appellant
fails to cite any authority or make a convincing argument that his trial attorney had a duty to
object to the jury instructions made by the court. It is in fact not a violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers for a court to instruct the jury on parole and transfer eligibility. We will
not entertain arguments unsupported by any legal authority.”) (citations omitted).
70. See, e.g., Weatherford v. State, 363 Ark. 579, 586, 215 S.W.3d 642, 648–49 (2005)
(upholding the trial court’s denial of relief on ineffective assistance of counsel claim where
Rule 37.1 did not provide sufficient factual evidence of witness’s proposed testimony and its
claimed effect on trial despite postconviction counsel’s request to expand page limitations to
permit development of argument which was denied by trial court).
71. The current rules provide that a deficient brief may be corrected at the direction of
the clerk or court, ARK. SUP. CT. R. 4-2(b)(3), but the supreme court has also simply dismissed appeals or affirmed cases based on deficiencies in the brief in the past. See e.g., Hubbard v. State, 334 Ark. 321, 324, 973 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1998) (affirming denial of relief in a
per curiam opinion for failure to include an abstract of the trial in the appellate brief). The
rule continues to authorize disposition by dismissal or affirmance when a party fails to correct a deficient brief after having been afforded notice and an opportunity to comply with the
applicable rule. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 4-2.
72. There are apparently no published rules regarding criteria for the exercise of discretion in dismissing Rule 37.1 appeals for noncompliance with rules governing the formatting
or the verification of pleadings or appellate briefs, nor is there any published rule requiring
that the appeal be considered and ruled on by the reviewing court, or by a single justice or
judge of the reviewing court.
73. See, e.g., Slater v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 499, at 1, 583 S.W.3d 84, 86 (“We assumed
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to footnote 1 in Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, 511
S.W.3d 845 (per curiam).”).
74. See supra notes 23–32 and accompanying text.
75. E.g., Shadwick v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 243, at 12, 519 S.W.3d 722, 732 (upholding
denial of relief on claim that trial counsel was ineffective for numerous reasons, including
failure to object to State’s assertion of territorial jurisdiction where computer images of minor
children claimed to have been sent from Arkansas to defendant and downloaded when he was
living in Montana). The court of appeals issued its decision in Shadwick on April 19, 2017,
shortly after the supreme court ordered the court of appeals to assume jurisdiction over Rule
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III. POST-TRIAL REMEDIES UNDER ARKANSAS LAW
The conclusion of the direct appeal process in the criminal case does
not preclude the convicted defendant from continuing to litigate issues that
may have arisen in the case, including issues that may have only arisen after
the trial or after the direct appeal. These remedies are often referred to as
“collateral” because they afford means to attack a conviction or sentence
outside the trial and appellate process.76 Commonly, they are referred to as
“habeas corpus,” although habeas corpus under Arkansas law refers to specific challenges governed by statute.77 The basic postconviction remedy recognized in Arkansas is the Rule 37 procedure created by the Arkansas Supreme Court.78
The Federal Constitution does not recognize the right of a criminal defendant to post-trial process for challenging the conviction or sentence, as
the Arkansas Supreme Court noted in an order issued in 1987.79 The court
described the situation it confronted at the time, after noting that there was
no duty upon the states to provide postconviction remedies.80 The court
complained:
Seldom is relief or a new trial granted under Rule 37. Yet, we are being
inundated with petitions, mostly from inmates of the Arkansas Department of Correction, seeking relief under Rule 37. Each petition must be
reviewed and considered, however involved, and most are lengthy and
detailed. We have a fulltime lawyer and secretary serving to handle such
petitions and assist the court. We have had to add another part-time lawyer to the staff. All of this work is related to petitions filed by prisoners.
In 1986, 189 such petitions were filed with written opinions issued in the
majority of the cases, usually finding them meritless. They are invariably
handwritten, lengthy (a recent one was 100 pages long), and generally attempt to retry the case or attempt to prove their lawyer incompetent. The

37.1 appeals alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on March 2, 2017. See id., 519 S.W.3d
722; see also Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1.
76. See, e.g., Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 552–53 (2011) (defining “collateral review”
and related term “collateral attack” as “indirect” attack on a judgment, often referred to as
“habeas corpus”).
77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-101 (West 2019).
78. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1.
79. In re Rule 37, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 293 Ark. 609, 609, 732 S.W.2d 458,
458 (1987); see also Maulding v. State, 299 Ark. 570, 571, 776 S.W.2d 339, 340 (1989)
(“States are not obligated to provide for post-conviction relief after the defendant has failed to
secure relief through direct review of his conviction.” (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551, 557 (1987))).
80. In re Rule 37, 293 Ark. at 609, 732 S.W.2d at 458 (citing Finley, 481 U.S. at 556–
57).
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three year time limitation in which petitions may be filed is ignored. Also the rule that states only one petition may be filed is often ignored. 81

Rather, the court recognized that “some relief should exist to set aside void
convictions;” continuing, “however, the remaining grounds for relief should
be reexamined.”82 It then concluded its order by referring the question of
continuing postconviction remedies in the then-current form for review to
the court’s advisory committee.83 The court’s observation that relief is seldom granted or that a new trial is rarely ordered under Rule 37 is confirmed
by Justice Josephine Linker Hart’s comment in a recent concurring opinion:
In the nearly thirty years since this court created the rule, I am aware of
only two cases in which a prisoner received a new trial pursuant to Rule
37: Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002), and Rackley v.
State, 2014 Ark. 39, 2014 WL 346713. Meanwhile, the procedural defaults that are distressingly common when an inmate attempts to invoke
Rule 37 bars [sic] the inmate from pursuing habeas relief in federal
court.84

81. Id., 732 S.W.2d at 458.
82. Id. at 610, 732 S.W.2d at 458.
83. Id., 732 S.W.2d at 458 (“We refer to the Supreme Court Committee on Rules of
Pleading, Practice and Procedure in Criminal Cases for consideration of the question of
whether and under what circumstances should we provide for and maintain a postconviction
proceeding.”).
84. McClinton v. State, 2018 Ark. 116, at 6–7, 542 S.W.3d 859, 863–64 (Hart, J., concurring). Justice Hart continued:
I believe that Rule 37 could have been an invaluable tool for this court to assess
whether the State of Arkansas is providing competent counsel as the state and
federal constitutions require. Effectiveness of counsel should be judged not
merely on whether a case is won or lost but also on whether defense counsel was
competent enough to help the finder of fact to decide the nature and level of culpability for a particular criminal act. Determining the proper level of culpability
directly corresponds to the length of a prison sentence. Without a competent defense, a criminal defendant could easily receive a much greater sentence than the
law contemplates. With Arkansas’s prison population exceeding 19,000, ineffective counsel is something that we simply cannot afford.
Id. at 7–8, 543 S.W.3d at 864.
With respect to Justice Hart’s reference to the two cases in which new trials had
been granted in Rule 37 actions, it is worth noting that the supreme court ordered relief on
appeal from a denial of relief on the Rule 37.1 petition in Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, at
13, 433 S.W.3d 234, 243. There, the court ordered dismissal of convictions on two counts of
the three-count information on which the petitioner had been convicted, while upholding his
conviction on Count 1, which charged delivery of cocaine—a sale of $100 worth of cocaine
base to undercover officers—that resulted in imposition of a sixty-year enhanced sentence.
Id. at 12, 433 S.W.3d at 243. The thirty-year term on the two counts that were ordered dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence was vacated when the supreme court found that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his challenge of insufficient evidence on those
counts at trial. Id., 433 S.W.3d at 243.
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Post-Trial Remedies Are Not Mandated by the Federal Constitution

The rights accorded by the Sixth Amendment expressly address the trial process, and the Federal Constitution is otherwise silent with respect to
post-trial proceedings.85 There is no constitutional provision requiring a state
to provide the criminal defendant with the option of filing a motion for new
trial,86 although States may choose to afford litigants the right to move for
new trial, as Arkansas does.87
Similarly, the Federal Constitution does not expressly provide for appeal from a criminal conviction.88 The Supreme Court essentially grafted a
right to direct appeal on state criminal process by relying on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause89 to hold that once a state has created
a right of appeal that could be accessed by financially capable litigants, indigent defendants must be accorded similar access.90 Thus, in Griffin v. Illinois,91 the Court required states to provide a free copy of the record of proceedings in the trial court, or its equivalent,92 to permit the indigent appellant
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The precise language of the Sixth Amendment guarantees,
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of
counsel for his defence.” The amendment does not refer to trial, appeal or post-conviction
proceedings with respect to the scope of the guarantee, but the Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to assistance of counsel does not extend to post-conviction proceedings
because the Constitutional does not expressly address the right to post-conviction process at
all. There is no right to post-conviction review, as the Court explained in Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief”) and, consequently, there is no right to assistance or effective assistance of counsel in
post-conviction proceedings, even in capital cases in which a state court defendant has been
sentenced to death. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989).
86. For instance, there is no mention of a right to file a motion for new trial in the Constitution, as the Supreme Court of the United States explained in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 400 (1993).
87. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3.
88. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (“An appeal from a judgment of
conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal.”). In McKane, the Court did recognize that many jurisdictions
had created a right to appeal from criminal convictions, but holding that this did not require a
finding that a right to appeal was necessarily implicit in the Federal Constitution, concluding:
“whether an appeal should be allowed, and, if so, under what circumstances, or on what conditions, are matters for each state to determine for itself.” Id. at 688. The right of appeal under
Arkansas law is included in the state constitution. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 11.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
90. For a summary of the process used by the Court to impose a constitutional requirement for access to state appellate process for indigent criminal defendants, see Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276–77 (2000).
91. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
92. Id. at 20. Subsequently, in Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) and Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Court
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comparable means to frame the argument on appeal with support from the
record of the proceedings in the court below.93
The appellate right was significantly extended in Douglas v. California,94 when the same equal protection analysis was applied to require assistance of counsel to indigent criminal appellants.95 However, the Douglas
addressed whether an alternative to the complete trial court record could suffice. The Draper
Court explained:
In all cases the duty of the State is to provide the indigent as adequate and effective an appellate review as that given appellants with funds—the State must provide the indigent defendant with means of presenting his contention to the appellate court which are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant with
similar contentions.
372 U.S. at 496. As a practical matter, however, counsel appointed to represent the indigent
defendant on appeal often cannot determine which issues should be raised on appeal in the
exercise of their best professional judgment without having an opportunity to review the
complete record of the proceedings in the trial court. Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 752
(1967) (appointed counsel’s failure to file record on appeal, without notice to client, resulted
in ineffective assistance by denying client appeal on the record).
93. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18–19. The majority based its equal protection analysis on its
recognition of the prevalence and significance of systems for appellate review in the states:
All of the States now provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions,
recognizing the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication of guilt
or innocence. Statistics show that a substantial proportion of criminal convictions
are reversed by state appellate courts. Thus to deny adequate review to the poor
means that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust
convictions which appellate courts would set aside.
Id.; see also Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (state rule requiring all appellants to
pay filing fee violated indigent’s right to review, precluding even defective appeal based on
insufficient record, as addressed in Griffin).
94. 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963).
95. Id. The implied Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel,
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), applies to counsel appointed to represent an indigent appellant in the first step of the direct appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins,
528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (standard for assessing claim of ineffective assistance on appeal is
that announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984), requiring proof of
defective performance on counsel’s part not attributable to an objectively reasonable strategic
decision that resulted in reasonable probability of different outcome in the proceedings);
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396–97 (1985) (failure to timely file required docketing notice
resulted in ineffective assistance when appeal dismissed). The Smith Court explained:
Respondent must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable, see
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–691 [], in failing to find arguable issues to appeal—
that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to
file a merits brief raising them. If Robbins succeeds in such a showing, he then
has the burden of demonstrating prejudice. That is, he must show a reasonable
probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure to file a merits brief,
he would have prevailed on his appeal.
528 U.S. at 285; see also Burnside v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 691, at 4, 537 S.W.3d 796, 803
(“Appellate counsel’s failure to raise a specific issue must have amounted to error of such
magnitude that it rendered appellate counsel’s performance constitutionally deficient under
the Strickland criteria.”).
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Court also limited the implied constitutional right to a direct appeal to a onestep process, therefore declining to extend the right to assistance of counsel
to discretionary appeals in state courts or federal courts:
We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to
rich and poor alike from a criminal conviction. We need not now decide
whether California would have to provide counsel for an indigent seeking a discretionary hearing from the California Supreme Court after the
District Court of Appeal had sustained his conviction, or whether counsel must be appointed for an indigent seeking review of an appellate affirmance of his conviction in this Court by appeal as of right or by petition for a writ of certiorari which lies within the Court’s discretion. 96

Similarly, there is no mention of postconviction or collateral process
for collateral attack on a criminal conviction or sentence in the Sixth
Amendment.97 The Court drew the constitutional line differentiating the
right to the single-step appeal and discretionary review in Ross v. Moffitt.98
There, the Court held that the Constitution does not afford an indigent criminal appellant the right to assistance of counsel in petitioning the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari to review a state court rejection of his federal
constitutional claim, nor the right to counsel in a state discretionary appeal,
in contrast to the right to counsel in the first appeal noted by the Douglas
Court.99 Because there is no express or inferred right to discretionary review
in the language of the Federal Constitution, the Ross Court found that there
was no right to assistance of counsel in prosecuting a discretionary petition:
“We do not believe that the Due Process Clause requires North Carolina to
provide respondent with counsel on his discretionary appeal to the State
Supreme Court.”100
Nevertheless, states have created systems for postconviction or collateral review of criminal convictions.101 They vary in terms of procedure but,
96. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356 (citations omitted).
97. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to
provide this avenue of relief.” (citing United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976)
(plurality opinion))).
98. 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974).
99. The Ross majority questioned the reasoning of Douglas: “The precise rationale for
the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being
derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the
Due Process Clause of that Amendment.” Id. at 608–09.
100. Id. at 610. The Arkansas Supreme Court has similarly held that there is no right to
assistance of counsel in Arkansas postconviction proceedings. Williams v. Porch, 2018 Ark.
1, at 3, 534 S.W.3d 152, 154 (“We have also made clear that the appointment of counsel in
postconviction proceedings is discretionary and not mandated.” (citing Mancia v. State, 2015
Ark. 115, at 27, 459 S.W.3d 259, 276)).
101. The variation in postconviction process adopted by the states prompted the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to propose a model statute designed to eliminate inconsisten-
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generally, permit a convicted defendant an option for raising issues that undermine the integrity of the conviction or sentence. While the lack of any
express requirement for provision for postconviction attack on the criminal
conviction or sentence in the Federal Constitution has been noted by the
Arkansas Supreme Court, it has also held that once the state has provided a
postconviction process for state court defendants, the process must be fair.102
Fairness in operation of postconviction proceedings is a particularly elusive
concept because the petitioning criminal defendant is not only not afforded a
right to assistance of counsel in the postconviction litigation process, there is
also no Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective representation. Even in
capital cases in which the postconviction petitioner has been sentenced to
death, ineffective representation in state or federal proceedings will not provide an avenue for relief from execution of the sentence.103 Thus, in Coleman v. Thompson,104 the Court held that state postconviction counsel’s failure to appeal from the trial court’s denial of relief, which resulted in a procedural default of Coleman’s claims, did not warrant federal habeas relief.105
Moreover, claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in state and federal
postconviction proceedings do not generally afford the postconviction petitioner claims for relief from adverse decisions in those proceedings in the
federal habeas corpus process, as provided by the controlling statute.106
cy in state procedures over sixty years ago. See The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1956). The states have not responded to eliminate these inconsistencies. The state postconviction process remains largely individualized by statute or rule. See
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.1; ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010 (West 2019); 16A A.R.S. R. CRIM. P. 32.1;
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1; SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 61; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850; IDAHO CODE §§ 19-4901
to -4911 (West 2019); 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2019); IND. R.P. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
1; IOWA CODE ANN. § 822.2 (West 2019); KY. R. CR. P. 11.42; TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ART.
11.01.
102. In Watkins v. State, 2010 Ark. 156, 362 S.W.3d 910, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reiterated: “While there is no constitutional right to a post-conviction proceeding, when a
state undertakes to provide collateral relief, due process requires that the proceeding be fundamentally fair.”. Id. at 5, 362 S.W.3d at 914–15 (citing Engram v. State, 360 Ark. 140, 200
S.W.3d 367 (2004); Porter v. State, 339 Ark. 15, 2 S.W.3d 73 (1999)).
103. See Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State PostConviction Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 354–60
(2003) (surveying jurisdictions imposing requirement for effective assistance of postconviction counsel in state postconviction proceedings).
104. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
105. Id. at 752–53; see also Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587 (1982) (holding no
constitutional violation based on counsel’s defective performance in representation in state
discretionary review proceeding following direct appeal).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2018) (“The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during
Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a
proceeding arising under section 2254.”). The single exception to this rule was judiciallycreated. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). In
Davila v. Davis, the Court refused to expand upon that exception, explaining:
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Suspension, Then Reinstatement, of Rule 37 in 1989

Interestingly, for a brief period of time, the defendant convicted in an
Arkansas circuit court did not have a specific postconviction remedy at all.
The Arkansas Supreme Court abolished its earlier version of Rule 37 by
order entered on May 30, 1989,107 and for some period of time, a defendant’s postconviction remedy under state law was limited to proceeding under Rule 36.4,108 which permitted the defendant to allege ineffective assistance by his trial counsel by motion for new trial filed within thirty days of
judgment.109 The claim of ineffectiveness raised in this procedure would
then be merged with the claims raised on direct appeal from the trial and
conviction to consolidate the appellate process into a single action.110 The
court reinstated Rule 37, which was facially less limited than the Rule 36.4
procedure, some fifteen months later.111 In an effort to expedite the postconviction process, the court reduced the time for filing for relief under Rule 37
from three years—under the previous rule—to sixty days when the defendant has appealed from a conviction by trial or ninety days when the defendant’s conviction results from a guilty plea.112 The newly modified and readopted Rule 37 became effective on January 1, 1991.113 An example of the
In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 [] (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 []
(2013), this Court announced a narrow exception to Coleman’s general rule. That
exception treats ineffective assistance by a prisoner’s state postconviction counsel as cause to overcome the default of a single claim—ineffective assistance of
trial counsel—in a single context—where the State effectively requires a defendant to bring that claim in state postconviction proceedings rather than on direct
appeal. The question in this case is whether we should extend that exception to
allow federal courts to consider a different kind of defaulted claim—ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. We decline to do so.
137 S. Ct. 2058, 2062–63 (2017); see infra note 295–96 and accompanying text for further
discussion of Davila v. Davis.
107. In re Abolishment of Rule 37 & the Revision of Rule 36 of the Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 299 Ark. 573, 770 S.W.2d 148 (1989); see Whitmore v. State, 299 Ark. 55,
62, 771 S.W.2d 266, 269 (1989) (explaining effect of change in postconviction process).
108. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 36.4.
109. Id. In Looney v. State, the court of appeals addressed the trial court’s failure to admonish the defendant concerning his right, pursuant to Rule 36.4, to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and explained the history of the change in postconviction
procedure. 32 Ark. App. 191, 192–93, 798 S.W.2d 452, 452–53 (1990). The court remanded
the case for compliance with the provisions of the rule. Id. at 193, 798 S.W.2d at 453.
110. Whitmore, 299 Ark. at 62, 771 S.W.2d at 269.
111. See In re Reinstatement of Rule 37 of Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, as Revised,
and the Amendment of Rule 26.1 and Rule 36.4 of the Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 303
Ark. 746, 797 S.W.2d 458 (1990); In re Post-Conviction Procedure, 303 Ark. 745, 797
S.W.2d 458 (1990).
112. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c).
113. In re Reinstatement of Rule 37 of Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 303 Ark. 746,
979 S.W.2d 458.
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implications of this change in Arkansas postconviction process was explained in Hubbard v. State:114
At the time of Hubbard’s conviction, Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule
37 had been abolished and was replaced with Rule 36.4. Under Rule
36.4, a defendant who wished to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel had to do so in a motion for a new trial within thirty days of the
date of the judgment. Although it is unclear whether Hubbard filed such
a motion, he subsequently pursued habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court. On November 5, 1995, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas ordered that a writ of
habeas corpus would issue “unless, within ninety (90) days, petitioner is
allowed to prosecute with the benefit of counsel, Rule 36.4 proceedings
in Monroe County Circuit Court and an appeal if desired. 115

Following reinstatement by the supreme court, Rule 37 has remained the
primary vehicle for postconviction, or collateral, attacks on convictions under Arkansas law.116 However, the overall scheme of remedies is rather Byzantine, including both legislative and judicially created remedies principally
defined by specific subject matter.
There are, in fact, a number of postconviction remedies that may be
available to Arkansas litigants to challenge unfavorable trial court dispositions and with which counsel should be familiar.117 The supreme court’s
order in Barnes, however, appears to affect only appeals from Rule 37 actions brought in circuit courts. This is because the other remedies do not
114. 334 Ark. 321, 322, 973 S.W.2d 804, 805 (1998); see also Kindall v. State, 2010 Ark.
342, 1 nn.1–2, 2010 WL 3721971, at *1 nn.1–2 (explaining retroactive implications of abolition of Rule 37 in individual case).
115. Hubbard, 334 Ark. at 322, 973 S.W.2d at 805.
116. In Spears v. State, the court of appeals explained that the reinstatement of Rule 37
resulted in deletion of the previous requirement that the defendant petition the appellate court
for leave to file the postconviction petition. No. CR 83-20, 1997 WL 618681, at *1 n.1 (Ark.
App. Oct. 2, 1997); see also Moss v. State, 3010 Ark. 284, at 1 n.1, 2010 WL 2210933, at *1
n.1. (explaining that under prior rule, Rule 37 petitioner convicted on his plea of guilty was
required to obtain leave from Arkansas Supreme Court to petition for relief, requiring showing that the conviction was a nullity, such as trial court’s lack of jurisdiction or violation of
double jeopardy). Rule 37.2(c)(i) no longer imposes the requirement that the petitioner first
obtain leave from the supreme court or, after Barnes, to file the Rule 37 petition. Instead, a
petitioner seeking relief from a conviction obtained on a plea of guilty may now file the petition without first obtaining leave to file “within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment” if no appeal was taken from the conviction. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c)(i).
In its footnote, the court cited In re Reinstatement of Rule 37 of Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 303 Ark. 746, 979 S.W.2d 458, but erroneously cited the Southwestern Reporter
citation as volume “979” when the citation to the supreme court’s order issued October 29,
1990, actually appears at “797 S.W.2d 458,” while Westlaw responds with no citation requested for “303 Ark. 746.” Spears, 1997 WL 618681, at *1 n.1.
117. See infra Section III.D.
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afford relief for claims brought as challenges to counsel’s performance as
defective under the Sixth Amendment, compromised by actual conflict of
interest impairing or distorting counsel’s performance, or in the rare case, by
rules or state action compromising counsel’s ability to perform effectively.
C.

Rule 37 Practice

The appeal in Barnes was characterized by the Arkansas Supreme
Court as arising from a denial of postconviction relief in an action brought
under Rule 37.1 of the criminal procedure rules,118 although the pro se litigant styled his motion in the trial court as a “belated motion to retract” his
guilty plea.119 In his pleading Barnes argued that his guilty plea was tainted
by trial counsel’s ineffective assistance.120 On appeal, the supreme court
held that claims attacking counsel’s effectiveness must be prosecuted under
Rule 37.1.121 The precise issues raised on the appeal involved Barnes’s request for appointment of counsel, a copy of the record, and an extension of
time to file the appellate brief,122 but the court interpreted the thrust of his
claim to be ineffective assistance of counsel, cognizable only pursuant Rule
37.1 regardless of the title of the pleading.123
Rule 37.1 provides a remedy for inmates124 challenging their convictions or sentences in the state’s circuit courts that must be filed in the court
118. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court claiming a right to be
released, or to have a new trial, or to have the original sentence modified on the
ground:
(i) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States or this state; or
(ii) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or
(iii) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law;
or
(iv) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack; may file a verified
petition in the court which imposed the sentence, praying that the sentence be
vacated or corrected.
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(a).
119. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 845.
120. Id., 511 S.W.3d at 845.
121. Id. at 1–2, 511 S.W.3d at 845 (“A petition for postconviction relief mounting a collateral attack on a judgment, regardless of the label placed on it by the petitioner, is considered pursuant to our postconviction rule.”).
122. Id. at 2, 511 S.W.3d at 846.
123. The court explained that Barnes apparently sought to avoid dismissal based on his
failure to file a verified petition, as required by Rule 37.1(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, by styling his petition as a “belated motion to retract” his guilty plea. Id. at 2–
3, 511 S.W.3d at 846–47.
124. The Arkansas Supreme Court has limited the right to petition for postconviction
relief to the remedy provided by Rule 37.1(a) to convicted defendants “in custody.” See supra
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of conviction within sixty days after the conclusion of the direct appeal, if
the case is appealed, or within ninety days of entry of the judgment and sentence on a plea of guilty when there is no appeal taken in the case.125
In considering the petition on its merits, the trial court of conviction126
may order an evidentiary hearing on contested issues of fact or law,127 or
dispose of the petition without hearing but with findings that may then be
addressed on appeal from its denial of relief.128 The standard for review of
the circuit court’s determination that relief is not warranted is high, requiring a finding that the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous; the court
explained in Wood v. State:129
Our standard of review in Rule 37.1 petitions is that, “on appeal from a
circuit court’s ruling on a petitioner’s request for Rule 37 relief, this
note 4 and accompanying text. A convicted defendant not in custody interested in asserting
federal constitutional claims challenging his conviction and sentence that would otherwise be
cognizable under Rule 37.1, may, however, proceed to present those federal claims to the
United States District Court pursuant to the federal habeas corpus statute applicable for state
court defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018); see Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989)
(“Our interpretation of the ‘in custody’ language has not required that a prisoner be physically confined in order to challenge his sentence on habeas corpus.”).
125. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c)(i)–(ii); see Wicks v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 499, at 9, 375
S.W.3d 769, 774 (“Appellant was required to pursue postconviction relief under Rule 37.1
within ninety days of the date of the entry of judgment. The time limitations in Rule 37.2(c)
are jurisdictional in nature, and, where they are not met, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to
grant postconviction relief.” (citing Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 231, 364 S.W.3d 46)); accord
Harris v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 381, at 8–9, 526 S.W.3d 43, 49.
126. Rule 37 does not directly refer to a requirement that the petition for postconviction
relief must be filed in the circuit court in which the conviction was obtained. However, in
Rule 37.2, there are references to the “appropriate circuit court.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c)(i),
(iii)– (iv). In subsection (a) the rule explains that if there is an appeal pending from the conviction in the “original case,” when a Rule 37 petition is filed, “no proceedings under this
rule shall be entertained by the circuit court while the appeal is pending.” ARK. R. CRIM. P.
37.2(a).
127. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.3(c).
128. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.3(a) (“If the petition and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the trial court shall make written
findings to that effect, specifying any parts of the files, or records that are relied upon to
sustain the court’s findings.”); see, e.g., Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 5–6, 403
S.W.3d 55, 59–60 (affirming denial of relief on written findings of trial court, cautioning that
trial court should hold evidentiary hearing “unless the files and record of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief”); accord England v. State, 2018 Ark. App.
137, at 11–15, 543 S.W.3d 553, 562–64 (holding that trial counsel’s failure to move to sever
counts involving two victims of incestuous sexual assault did not constitute defective performance where petitioner could not show severance motion would have been meritorious, and
holding that lack of merit because offenses against victims intertwined, as both were present
at the same time during some assaults and would be available to testify against defendant in
joint trial).
129. 2015 Ark. 477, 478 S.W.3d 194.
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court will not reverse the circuit court’s decision granting or denying
post-conviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate
court, after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”130

If the petition is meritorious, the circuit court may order relief from the conviction or sentence imposed.131
Despite the apparently broad grant of jurisdiction provided, the relief
available in an action brought pursuant to Rule 37 is actually quite limited
by case law, whether under Rule 37.1, which generally governs the authority
of the trial court, or Rule 37.5, which specifically addresses the postconviction action brought by a defendant sentenced to death.132
1.

Limiting the Scope of Review in Rule 37 Postconviction Actions

While the language of Rule 37.1 is very broad in authorizing attacks on
sentences—and, by implication, convictions—the petitioner’s ability to do
so is extremely limited by case law. First, the court has consistently viewed
postconviction proceedings as a procedural vehicle for addressing claims
that could not have been addressed in the trial and direct appeal process. For

130. Id. at 2–3, 478 S.W.3d at 197 (quoting Mason v. State, 2013 Ark. 492, at 1–2, 430
S.W.3d 759, 761); accord Slater v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 499, at 4, 583 S.W.3d 84, 88.
131. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.4 (“If the circuit court finds that for any reason the petitioner is
entitled to relief, then the circuit court may set aside the original judgment, discharge the
petitioner, resentence him or her, grant a new trial, or otherwise correct the sentence, as may
appear appropriate in the proceedings.”); see, e.g., Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, at 12, 433
S.W.3d 234, 243 (granting relief based on trial counsel’s failure to make adequate motion for
directed verdict where evidence at trial was insufficient to support convictions on two counts
charged in the information); State v. Harrison, 2012 Ark. 198, at 2–3, 404 S.W.3d 830, 833
(granting relief on Rule 37 petition where trial counsel failed to investigate witness’s prior
juvenile conviction for capital murder and impeach witness at trial).
132. If the petitioning defendant has been sentenced to death, the postconviction remedy
is governed by the provisions of Rule 37.5. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5. Rule 37.5 provides
procedural framework for litigation of claims brought by death-sentenced inmates designed
to comply with federal law, expediting the execution of death sentences imposed in state
capital prosecutions. Id. With respect to the limitation on claims cognizable in Arkansas
postconviction proceedings, the range of claims which may be brought in capital challenges
parallels those generally cognizable in cases in which defendants have not been sentenced to
death, including those who may have been charged with capital offenses but were sentenced
to life imprisonment or lesser sentences. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(a) (“Purpose and Scope.
This rule shall apply only to persons under a sentence of death. Except as otherwise provided
in this rule, the provisions of Rules 37.1, 37.2, 37.3 and 37.4 shall apply to a petition for postconviction relief filed by a person under sentence of death. The intent of this rule is to comply
with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2261 et seq.”). ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5; see supra note 4 for
text of Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1(a).
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instance, in Sasser v. State,133 a death penalty case, the court offered its
standard explanation with respect to the scope of appeal:
We have previously held that even constitutional issues must be raised in
the trial court and on direct appeal, rather than in Rule 37 proceedings.
Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988). Rule 37 is a postconviction remedy, and as such, does not provide a method for the review of mere error in the conduct of the trial or to serve as a substitute
for appeal.134

The issue Sasser advanced involved an arguably flawed jury instruction
on a lesser offense on which his capital felony murder charge rested, but
which had not been challenged by trial counsel.135 The court’s rejection of
the postconviction challenge reflects the general rule that Rule 37 may not
be used to assert claims that should have been brought on direct appeal
based on error preserved by proper objection at trial.136 The notion of procedural default relied upon by the Arkansas appellate courts to avoid review of
those claims on the merits on direct appeal thus extends to prevent litigation
of defaulted claims in the postconviction process. The Sasser court further
explained that the exception to this general rule of procedural default would
apply to claims of “fundamental” or “structural error,” but this proposition
may not actually be consistently applied by the court:
We have made an exception, however, for errors that are so fundamental
as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack. In Collins, for example, we held that the right to trial by a twelvemember jury is a fundamental right that fell within the exception. When
we review a “fundamental” or “structural” error either on direct appeal
or through the exception just explained, the fundamental nature of the error precludes application of the “harmless-error” analysis.137

As explained in Wicks v. State,138 the court’s consistent rejection of “plain
error” review139 suggests that its purported willingness to review claims of
“fundamental” error in Sasser is quite restricted.
133. 338 Ark. 375, 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999).
134. Id. at 383, 993 S.W.2d at 906 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 385, 993 S.W.2d at 907.
136. Id. at 383, 993 S.W.2d at 906.
137. Id. at 383–84, 993 S.W.2d at 906 (citing Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322, 920 S.W.2d
846 (1996)).
138. 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).
139. “Plain error” review is arguably available for matters involving error in admission or
exclusion of evidence pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Evidence 103(d), which provides,
“Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.” However, in Wicks the court expressly
rejected “plain error” review in Arkansas law. 270 Ark. at 785, 606 S.W.2d at 369 (“Some
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For instance, in Kennedy v. State,140 the court found that the trial
court’s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense, a right recognized under state law, did not constitute a claim that could be raised in Rule
37 as a matter of fundamental or plain error:
Kennedy further argues that our cases have recognized the importance of
lesser included offense instructions because we have previously held that
the jury must be so instructed even when there is the “slightest evidence”
to support a finding of a lesser included offense. We conclude that the
right to have the jury instructed on all lesser included offenses supported
by the evidence is not a fundamental right that warrants review of the
omission of such instructions for the first time in a Rule 37 proceeding.141

Thus, claims that could have been raised in the trial and direct appeal process, but were procedurally defaulted, cannot be revived in the postconviction process under Rule 37, as the State argued in Kennedy.142
Nor can a petitioner use Rule 37 to reargue claims that were raised on
direct appeal and rejected on their merits, except in the rare situation in
which a change in the controlling law would have required the appellate
court to rule differently in the appeal. Thus, in Fudge v. State,143 the court
rejected a claim raised in postconviction that had been rejected in the supreme court’s disposition under Rule 4-3(h) and (i) in reviewing trial objections not argued on the direct appeal.144 It concluded that the issue had been
decided against the petitioner on appeal as a result of the summary findings
in its opinion: “Because this issue was settled in Fudge’s direct appeal, it is
now the law of the case and cannot be reargued here.”145
And in Howard v. State,146 the court rejected a claim raised in postconviction that was not asserted in a petition for writ of certiorari, although it
could have been presented to the Supreme Court of the United States based
courts, especially the federal courts, have a ‘plain error’ rule, under which plain errors affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
trial court. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 52(b); State v. Meiers, 412 S.W.2d 478
(Mo. 1967). In Arkansas, however, we do not have such a rule.”). And, with respect to Arkansas Rules of Evidence 103(d), the Wicks court explained that the rule was permissive, not
mandatory, and thus, did not require the court to consider unpreserved error. Id. at 787, 606
S.W.2d at 370 (“If there is any other exception to our general rule that an objection must be
made in the trial court, we have not found it in our review of our case law.”).
140. 338 Ark. 125, 991 S.W.2d 606 (1999).
141. Id. at 129, 991 S.W.2d at 609.
142. Id. at 128–29, 991 S.W.2d at 608.
143. 361 Ark. 412, 206 S.W.3d 850 (2005).
144. Id. at 428–30, 206 S.W.3d at 862–64.
145. Id. at 429, 206 S.W.3d at 863 (citing Camargo v. State, 337 Ark. 105, 987 S.W.2d
680 (1999); Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.2d 151 (2004)).
146. 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006).
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on its recent decisions.147 This suggests that the Arkansas position is that
even newly announced decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
may not afford a basis for arguing claims not litigated on direct appeal. The
Howard court explained:
In his second point on appeal, Howard argues that, under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 [] (2002), the information charging him with capital
murder was defective because it failed to enumerate any of the four aggravating circumstances upon which the State relied to obtain the death
penalty.4 The two counts of information charging Howard with capital
murder, filed in Little River County Circuit Court on December 19,
1997, stated only that Howard was charged with committing capital
murder “with the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the
death of another person[.]” The information did not enumerate the statutory aggravating factors that the State subsequently submitted to the jury.
As with Howard’s first argument, this is a claim that should have been
presented on direct appeal. As the State points out, even though Ring
was decided mere days before this court denied Howard’s petition for
rehearing, the direct-review process encompasses certiorari proceedings.
See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 [] (1994). Thus, Howard could have
presented his Ring- and Allen-based argument in his petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, but he did not. Accordingly, he is barred from raising it for the first time during the course of his
postconviction proceedings. See Williams v. State, 346 Ark. 54, 56
S.W.3d 360 (2001) (even constitutional issues must be raised on direct
appeal, rather than in Rule 37 proceedings).148

In short, the general rule is that “Rule 37 does not provide an opportunity for
an appellant to reargue points that were settled on direct appeal. . . Therefore, there is no merit to Howard’s arguments on this issue.”149
Howard and other decisions confirm the position taken by the Arkansas
Supreme Court in its view of the limitation on presentation of issues in the
Rule 37 process:
Generally, Rule 37 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have
been raised in the trial or argued on appeal. See Camargo v. State, 346
Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001). Stated another way, it is not appropriate to raise trial errors, including constitutional errors, for the first time
in a Rule 37 proceeding. See Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33, 13

147. Id. at 27–28, 238 S.W.3d at 32–33.
148. Id., 238 S.W.3d at 32–33.
149. Id. at 42, 238 S.W.3d at 43 (citing Kemp v. State, 348 Ark. 750, 74 S.W.3d 224
(2002); Coulter v. State, 343 Ark. 22, 31 S.W.3d 826 (2000)).
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S.W.3d 904 (2000); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643
(1988).150

Thus, Rule 37.1 does not provide for raising issues for the first time
that could have been litigated in the direct appeal, nor does it afford the petitioner an opportunity to relitigate issues that were addressed in the direct
appeal and decided adversely to him.151
2.

Litigating Ineffective Assistance Claims in Rule 37.1

The practical effect of the limitations on claims cognizable in Rule 37
proceedings imposed by the Arkansas Supreme Court is that the majority of
claims that might result in relief arise in the context of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.152 These claims rest primarily on the guarantee of assistance of counsel in the Sixth Amendment153 and the application of the federal protection as the controlling definition of the right for Arkansas litigants.154
150. Id. at 26, 238 S.W.3d at 32.
151. However, in State v. Harrison, the State argued, unsuccessfully, that an issue raised
in a Rule 37 that petition had been considered on direct appeal and decided adversely to the
petitioner was barred from reconsideration in postconviction litigation, relying on the “law of
the case” doctrine. 2012 Ark. 198, at 7–8, 404 S.W.3d 830, 835–36. The supreme court disagreed. Id. at 8, 404 S.W.3d at 836. On direct appeal, Harrison argued that the prosecution
violated its obligation to disclose favorable evidence to the defense, the juvenile adjudication
for capital murder of its witness. Id. at 6, 404 S.W.3d at 835; see also Harrison v. State, 371
Ark. 652, 269 S.W.3d 321 (2007). In the postconviction action, in contrast, he argued that
trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in failing to discover the prior adjudication,
which had been the subject of a published decision issued by the court of appeals. Harrison,
2012 Ark. 198, at 7, 404 S.W.3d at 835. In rejecting the State’s argument, the supreme court
explained:
In short, the issue that was adjudicated on direct appeal was the prosecutor’s
conduct in failing to disclose, and the issue at the Rule 37 proceeding was the defense counsel’s conduct in failing to investigate and then develop a defense.
These are two distinct issues. The latter of these issues, trial counsel’s effectiveness in investigating and developing a defense implicating Ingram was not adjudicated on direct appeal, and resolution of that issue is therefore not barred by
law of the case. Accordingly, we find no merit to the State’s argument that the
circuit court’s findings on the ineffectiveness of trial counsel are barred by law of
the case.
Id. at 8, 404 S.W.3d at 836 (emphasis added).
152. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 51, 238 S.W.3d 24, 49 (Hannah, C.J., dissenting) (“Rule 37 petitions most often concern issues of alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel.”).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantee that “the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence,” has been held to include
the right to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970).
154. See Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 3, 403 S.W.3d 55, 58.
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Strickland v. Washington155 is the controlling United States Supreme
Court decision defining the scope of the Sixth Amendment guarantee. It
establishes a two-prong test for counsel’s constitutional effectiveness, requiring first, proof that counsel rendered defective performance not reflecting an objectively reasonable strategic decision, and second, reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the case would have
been different.156
Other Sixth Amendment bases for violation of the guarantee to assistance of counsel arise in context of conflicts of interest compromising counsel’s performance, generally requiring a showing that counsel’s conflict actually compromised the client’s case under Cuyler v. Sullivan,157 and rare
situations in which a rule or trial court ruling deprived the defendant of
counsel’s effective assistance, such as the trial court’s ruling denying defense counsel the right to make a closing statement in a bench trial.158
In Conley v. State,159 the Arkansas Supreme Court discussed the burden
convicted defendants must satisfy in order to establish a claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel based on the Sixth Amendment test set by the
Court in Strickland.160 The court explained:
In asserting ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the petitioner first must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient.
Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. 489, 385 S.W.3d 228. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Adams v. State, 2013 Ark. 174, 427 S.W.3d 63. The reviewing court must
indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Scott v. State, 2012
Ark. 199, 406 S.W.3d 1. The defendant claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel has the burden of overcoming that presumption by identifying
the acts and omissions of counsel which, when viewed from counsel’s
perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasona-

155. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
156. Id. at 694. In Sparkman v. State, the court reversed the circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief based on trial counsel’s failure to object to admission of the accused’s uncounseled confession, given under questioning by detective without notice to counsel already
appointed to represent accused, constituted defective performance and noting that accused’s
confession is “probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted
against him.” 373 Ark. 35, 50–52, 281 S.W.3d 277, 281–83 (2008) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991)). The court concluded that Sparkman had satisfied both
the defective performance and probable prejudice prongs of the Strickland test for ineffective
assistance and reversed and remanded for new trial. Id. at 52, 281 S.W.3d at 283.
157. 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980).
158. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975).
159. 2014 Ark. 172, 433 S.W.3d 234.
160. Id. at 4–5, 433 S.W.3d at 239 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668).
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ble professional judgment. Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403
S.W.3d 55.
Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a demonstration that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. 161

The state supreme court has also explained that “in making a determination on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [it] considers the totality of the evidence.”162 This language would suggest that when counsel’s
representation includes more than one instance of defective performance,
the totality of the evidence would require the reviewing court to assess the
cumulative effect of counsel’s errors in arriving at the determination of
whether the defendant was afforded effective assistance. This view apparently agrees with the majority of jurisdictions that have held that cumulative
error analysis does apply to claims resting on multiple instances of counsel’s
deficient performance.163
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has rejected application of cumulative error in the review of ineffective assistance claims, 164 a position
also taken by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals165 and other jurisdictions.166 This approach fails to recognize the repeated reference to counsel’s
161. Id., 433 S.W.3d at 239.
162. State v. Harrison, 2012 Ark. 198, at 4, 404 S.W.3d 830, 833.
163. See, e.g., James v. Warden, No. CV104003622, 2014 WL 1646974, at *28 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2014) (noting majority of courts have applied cumulative error doctrine in
assessing effectiveness of counsel’s assistance (citing Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148,
1188 (10th Cir. 2012); Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553, 564 (5th Cir. 2007); Dugas v.
Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 335 (1st Cir. 2005); Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir.
2001); Harris By & Through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995); Kubat
v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 370 (7th Cir. 1989); Suggs v. State, 923 So.2d 419, 441 (Fla. 2005);
Schofield v. Holsley, 642 S.E.2d 56, 60 n.1 (Ga. 2007); State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 500
(Iowa 2012); Evans v. State, 28 P.3d 498, 524 (Nev. 2001); Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36
A.3d 121, 161 (Pa. 2012); State v. Thiel, 665 N.W.2d 305, 321 (Wis. 2003))).
164. E.g., Parks v. State, 301 Ark. 513, 515, 785 S.W.2d 213, 215 (1990).
165. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant may
not build constitutional claim on series of counsel’s errors).
166. See Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir.1998) (“To the extent this [c]ourt
has not specifically stated that ineffective assistance of counsel claims, like claims of trial
court error, must be reviewed individually, rather than collectively, we do so now.”). The
Fisher court reviewed the positions taken by other circuits:
For example, in Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 968 [] (1996), the Eighth Circuit expressly held that an attorney’s acts
or omissions “that are not unconstitutional individually cannot be added together
to create a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1233; see also Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d
143, 147 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that cumulative-error analysis evaluates only
effect of matters determined to be error, not cumulative effect of non-errors);
United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 917–18 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United
States v. Gutierrez, 995 F.2d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1993) (same). But see Williams v.
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“errors” in the opinion in Strickland.167 Arguably, then, Arkansas fails to
apply the proper standard for review of ineffective assistance claims.
A significant part of the problem for petitioners asserting ineffective
assistance claims is the clear tendency of the state supreme court to defer to
counsel’s exercise of judgment in resolving claims of defective performance.168 For instance, even in a capital case in which the death sentence
had been imposed,169 Wertz v. State,170 the court explained: “[W]ith respect
to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim regarding the decision of trial
counsel to call a witness, such matters are generally trial strategy and outside the purview of Rule 37.1.”171
Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that “a petitioner may
demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions
was [prejudicial]”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting
that a “claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel’s actions”).
Id. at 852–53.
167. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 678–79, 682, 693–96 (1984).
168. See Slater v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 499, at 4, 533 S.W.3d 84, 88 (citing Rose v.
State, 2017 Ark. App. 355, 526 S.W.3d 11).
169. In capital cases in which the petitioner has been sentenced to death, the postconviction petition proceeds pursuant to Rule 37.5, not 37.1. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5. Because a death
sentence has been imposed, the appeal from denial of relief proceeds directly to the state
supreme court. McGehee v. State, 344 Ark. 602, 604, 43 S.W.3d 125, 126 (2001) (explaining
that supreme court jurisdiction for defendant sentenced to death is pursuant to Rule 37 of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(8)).
170. 2014 Ark. 240, 434 S.W.3d 895.
171. Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 900 (emphasis added). Note that the court referenced “Rule
37.1,” in explaining its position on trial counsel’s exercise of discretion, rather than “Rule
37.5.” Id., 434 S.W.3d at 900. Rule 37.5(a), however, explains: “This rule shall apply only to
persons under a sentence of death. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the provisions of
Rules 37.1, 37.2, 37.3 and 37.4 shall apply to a petition for post-conviction relief filed by a
person under sentence of death.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(a). Section (a), thus, provides that
only the specific procedural requirements of Rule 37.5 for death penalty cases are unique to
capital prosecutions, such that principles of law apply in capital cases in which defendants
have been sentenced to death and those in which death was not imposed and non-capital
cases with equal force. Id. However, Criminal Appellate Rule 10 expressly provides for different standards for appellate review in cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed
but applies to review on direct appeal. ARK. R. APP. P.—CRIM. 10. For instance, two provisions appear to require the review of error regardless of preservation by trial objection:
(b) Mandatory Review. Whenever a sentence of death is imposed, the Supreme
Court shall review the following issues in addition to other issues, if any, that a
defendant may enumerate on appeal. Counsel shall be responsible for abstracting
the record and briefing the issues required to be reviewed by this rule and shall
consolidate the abstract and brief for such issues and any other issues enumerated
on appeal. The Court shall consider and determine:
...
(iv) whether the trial court failed in its obligation to intervene without objection
to correct a serious error by admonition or declaring a mistrial;
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With respect to the specific reassignment of appellate jurisdiction in
Barnes, however, one obvious problem is that while the court redirected
cases to the court of appeals in which claims of ineffective assistance have
been asserted, Arkansas cases demonstrate that claims other than those alleging ineffective assistance remain cognizable under Rule 37. For example,
in Pardue v. State,172 the court noted:
At the postconviction-relief hearing, appellant Pardue waived the arguments in his pro se petition asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.
Counsel’s arguments presented at the hearing asserted appellant lacked
the capacity to intelligently and voluntarily enter a guilty plea, or that the
pleading procedure was defective. Appellant raises four points for reversal: (1) use of prescription medications rendered his plea invalid; (2) his
plea was not knowing and voluntary because the conditions were not
clearly stated and assented to on the record; (3) his plea was void because he was not asked and did not assent to the factual basis; (4) sentencing as a habitual offender should be void because the state failed to
charge appellant as a habitual offender or because the trial court failed to
fully advise appellant or require a factual basis.173

This recitation of claims brought in a Rule 37 petition show that the remedy
is not limited to arguments that counsel failed to provide effective assistance
but may include other grounds for attacking the conviction or sentence imposed by the trial court.
Under the limited directive in the Barnes footnote, it could be argued
that the claim should be properly presented to the Arkansas Supreme Court
because it is not restricted to ineffective assistance allegations. However, the
supreme court’s decision to simply change appellate jurisdiction for these
claims by footnote, rather than by published order, leaves unexplained the
full extent of appellate jurisdiction redirected to the court of appeals in the
Barnes footnote. Still, that this might remain an unresolved issue is suggested by Judge Whiteaker’s opinion for the court in which he referred to the
(v) whether the trial court erred in failing to take notice of an evidentiary error
that affected a substantial right of the defendant;
Id.
The requirements imposed upon review of capital cases in which a death sentence has been
imposed by the Arkansas Supreme Court itself in its adoption of Criminal Appellate Rule
10(b)(iv) and (v) suggest nothing less than recognition of a rule of plain or fundamental error
in those cases, contrary to the general approach taken by the court in Wicks v. State, 270 Ark.
781, 785, 606 S.W.2d 366, 369 (1980). But the decisions in Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375,
993 S.W.2d 901 (1999) and Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006), do not
support any conclusion that Rule 10 requires the court to overrule its previous position generally rejecting review of unpreserved error.
172. 363 Ark. 567, 215 S.W.3d 650 (2005).
173. Id. at 569–70, 215 S.W.3d at 653.
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Arkansas Supreme Court’s transfer of a majority of its Rule 37 appellate
jurisdiction to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.174
D.

Other Postconviction Remedies Under Arkansas Law

There are at least four other procedural vehicles for convicted criminal
defendants seeking relief from their convictions or sentences, each based on
discrete theories of violations compromising their substantial rights. Ironically, perhaps in light of the position taken in the footnote to the Court’s
order in Barnes, the appeal in each of these procedural remedies lies in the
Arkansas Supreme Court.175 This may be consistent with the underlying
thinking in Rule 1-2(a), which provides that the supreme court has appellate
jurisdiction in actions involving extraordinary relief, “quo warranto, prohibition, injunction, or mandamus directed to the state, county, or municipal
officials or to circuit courts.”176 The remedies involved in collateral attacks
on criminal judgments are not included in this list but are, in a real sense,
extraordinary because they operate outside the regular course of civil and
criminal litigation.
The four alternative remedies are briefly summarized below.177
1.

Statutory Attack on an Illegal Sentence

Section 16-90-111 of the Arkansas Code Annotated provides a remedy
for imposition of an illegal sentence, rather than a sentence illegally imposed, brought in the trial court of conviction.178 This remedy overlaps the
provisions in Rule 37.1(a)(ii) and (a)(iii).179 While the state supreme court
has held that a challenge to illegal imposition of sentence is only cognizable
in a Rule 37.1 action, it continues to recognize that facially illegal sentences
may still be brought pursuant to section 16-90-111.180 Rule 37.1 would also
174. Bridgeman v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 3–4, 525 S.W.3d 459, 462.
175. E.g., Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark. 760, 762, 68 S.W.3d 289, 290 (2002) (“An appeal
is the proper procedure for the review of a circuit court’s denial of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.”).
176. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(3).
177. See infra Sections III.D.1–4.
178. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-111 (West 2019).
179. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1(a) provides, in pertinent parts:
(a) A petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court claiming a right to be
released, or to have a new trial, or to have the original sentence modified on the
ground:
...
(ii) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or
(iii) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law;
180. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 380, at 1, 2016 WL 6518511, at *1–2; Halfacre v.
State, 2015 Ark. 105, at 2–3, 460 S.W.3d 282, 284 (per curiam).
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afford the petitioner the option of raising a challenge to the legality of the
sentence imposed by postconviction petition within the time limits imposed
by the rule, according to the text of subsections (b) and (c). In contrast, there
is no time limit for filing the claim under section 16-90-111.181 The petition
to correct an illegal sentence must be filed in the circuit court of conviction,
as the court explained in Wesley v. Kelley:182
A petition under section 16-90-111 is a request for postconviction relief
from a judgment of conviction; as such, it is properly filed in the trial
court where the judgment was entered under the docket number for the
criminal judgment being challenged. 183

The court also explained that the petition should name the State as the defendant, rather than the Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction.184
2.

Attack on Illegal Sentence by Statutory Writ of Habeas Corpus

Second, where a trial court acts outside or in excess of its jurisdiction,
the defendant may, alternatively, challenge the action by petitioning for habeas corpus relief, pursuant to section 16-112-101.185 The most common
claim that warrants relief is based on imposition of a conviction or sentence
by the circuit court not authorized by statute, most typically a sentence im181. Green v. State, 2017 Ark. 361, at 2 n.1, 533 S.W.3d 81, 82 n.1; Gardner v. State,
2017 Ark. 230, at 2, 2017 WL 3300528, at *2.
182. 2017 Ark. 194, 519 S.W.3d 693.
183. Id. at 2 n.2, 519 S.W.3d at 695 n.1.
184. Id. at 2, 519 S.W.3d at 695. The more recent decision in Board of Trustees of the
University of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, 585 S.W.3d 616, may ultimately bear on
reliance on section 16-90-111 as a procedural vehicle for challenging illegal sentences. The
court held that the Arkansas constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes actions
against the State in state courts except in limited circumstances. Id. at 3–6, 585 S.W.3d at
619–20. Justice Baker, joined by Justice Hart, dissenting, suggests that “postconviction cases” could fall within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition of actions against the State as
a party. Id. at 18–19, 585 S.W.3d at 627. Andrews would appear to reject the court’s decision
in Lenard v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 186, at 6, 519 S.W.3d 682, 688, in which the court described
those circumstances in which an action against the State, or naming the State as a defendant,
is not precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the court rendered a decision in Lukach v. State, 2018 Ark. 208, 548 S.W.3d 810, issued on June 7, 2018, six months
after the decision in Andrews, which was issued on January 18, 2018. Lukach was an action
brought under section 16-90-111, suggesting that the concern originally expressed by Justice
Baker in Andrews, has impliedly been addressed by the supreme court in ruling on the merits
in this action naming the State as party defendant. Id. at 4, 548 S.W.3d at 812.
185. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-101 (West 2019). The writ of habeas corpus is designed
to protect the individual from illegal confinement as a result of action taken by public officials or actors. Meny v. Norris, 340 Ark. 418, 422–23, 13 S.W.3d 143, 146. The state constitution expressly provides that the writ shall not be suspended. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 11.
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posed beyond the trial court’s statutory authority.186 This claim is similar to
that available under section 16-90-111, but the petition is filed in the circuit
having physical jurisdiction over the petitioner because of his place of confinement,187 rather than in the trial court of conviction.188
The habeas court’s jurisdiction is not limited to claims based on facially-defective judgments, those in which the sentence reflected in the judgment and commitment order is outside the trial court’s jurisdiction. In
Gardner v. Hobbs,189 the court held that the burden is on the petitioner contesting: “A writ of habeas corpus is proper only when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its face or when a trial court lacked jurisdiction over the
cause.”190
Even though the circuit court may be within its discretion in imposing
punishment in accordance with the controlling statute, subsequent action
may serve to require relief from a sentence lawful at the time it was imposed, as the Arkansas Supreme Court’s disposition in Jackson v. Norris,191
186. For instance, in Flowers v. Norris, the court held that an illegal sentence claim implicates jurisdictional error which cannot be waived and can be asserted on direct appeal or in
a petition for habeas corpus without having been preserved by timely objection in the trial
court. 347 Ark. 760, 763–64, 68 S.W.3d 289, 291–92 (2002). While the court denied relief on
the claim asserted, it did modify the sentence imposed in the case where the trial court improperly imposed a concurrent sentence of forty years on a Class A felony on one of the
charges on which Flowers had been convicted on his plea of guilty, reducing that sentence to
the thirty year maximum punishment for attempted capital murder. Id. at 767, 68 S.W.3d at
293
187. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-105(b)(1) (West 2019). As with Rule 37.1 claims, the
circuit court only has jurisdiction if the petitioner is actually confined pursuant to the illegal
sentence. In State v. Wilmoth, for example, the Court noted that Wilmoth had been released
from custody two years before he filed for relief. 369 Ark. 346, 351, 255 S.W.3d 419, 422
(2007). Similarly, in Pardue v. State, the petitioner was confined on a federal conviction,
rather than on the basis of a state conviction, at the time he filed his habeas petition, having
already discharged the state sentence. 363 Ark. 567, 215 S.W.3d 650 (2005). And in Bradford v. State, the Court explained that because the conviction the petitioner challenged as
illegally resulting in his confinement had been reversed on appeal and dismissed, he could
not support a valid habeas corpus claim. 2011 Ark. 494, at 5, 2011 WL 5588934, at *3. His
claim that he was illegally confined was rejected because Arkansas Department of Corrections records showed that he was actually serving three other sentences, including a life sentence, on other offenses on which he had been convicted. Id. at 1–2, 2011 WL 5588934, at
*1.
188. E.g., Wesley v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 260, at 2, 2014 WL 2465503, at *1 (“Appellant’s
petition to correct the sentence that was imposed in Nevada County was filed in the wrong
court because the circuit court in Lee County had no jurisdiction to consider the petition to
correct a judgment of conviction that had not been entered in Lee County. While the statute
refers to ‘any circuit court,’ it is the court where the judgment was entered that has authority
to act under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111.” (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 1690-111 (West 2019))).
189. 2014 Ark. 346, 469 S.W.3d 663.
190. Id. at 2, 469 S.W.3d at 669 (emphasis added).
191. 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906.
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demonstrates. There, the life sentence without parole mandatorily imposed
under Arkansas law was invalidated for the juvenile offender by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama,192 and the companion case of Jackson v. Hobbs,193 which originated in the Arkansas courts.194
On remand from the Court’s decision, the state court reversed the denial of
habeas corpus relief, applying the decision in Miller/Jackson retroactively,195 and by implication, finding that the circuit court’s imposition of the
mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole was beyond the scope
of its lawful authority.196
Finally, although the state habeas corpus statute provides that the petitioner has the option of filing the petition directly in the state supreme
court,197 Amendment 80 to the state constitution subsequently limited the
court’s original jurisdiction to specific actions that do not include habeas
corpus actions.198
3.

Statutory Habeas Corpus Claims of Actual Innocence

Third, a defendant claiming actual innocence may seek testing for exculpatory DNA or other scientific evidence by writ of habeas corpus under a
separate statutory provision.199 The statutory process for raising an actual
innocence claim is complicated, requiring the defendant to demonstrate that
the scientific evidence, upon which the claim is based, is either newly discovered or newly available scientific evidence200 that would be sufficiently
exculpatory “to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would find the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.”201
Critical to the defendant’s right to testing under the statutory scheme is a
showing that the scientific evidence would address an issue at trial, such as

192. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
193. 565 U.S. 1013 (2012).
194. Jackson, 2013 Ark. 175, at 2, 426 S.W.3d at 907.
195. Id. at 6, 426 S.W.3d at 909–11.
196. Id. at 2, 426 S.W.3d at 907.
197. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-102(a)(1) (West 2019) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall
be issued upon proper application by a Justice of the Supreme Court or a judge of the circuit
court. The power of the Supreme Court and circuit court to issue writs of habeas corpus shall
be coextensive with the state.”).
198. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 2.
199. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201 (West 2019).
200. Id. § 16-112-201(a)(1) (referring to scientific evidence not available at the time of
trial).
201. The statutory test for obtaining relief requires that the scientific evidence was not
available at the time of trial and “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,”
the evidence would be sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence test. Id. § 16-112201 (a)(2).
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the perpetrator’s identity, upon which a doubt as to guilt could logically
rest.202
4.

Writ of Error Coram Nobis

Finally, the writ of error coram nobis permits a defendant to petition
for leave to raise claims outside the trial record. In Mason v. State,203 the
Arkansas Supreme Court explained:
The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered
while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it
had been known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or
fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of
judgment.204

Moreover, relief by writ of error coram nobis is available for only certain
specified claims of such significance that relief is required to prevent injustice, as the court explained in Penn v. State:205
The writ is granted only when there is an error of fact extrinsic to the
record such as insanity at the time of trial, a coerced plea of guilty, or
material evidence withheld by the prosecutor. It must be a fact which
might have resulted in a different verdict. In simple terms, this writ is a
legal procedure to fill a gap in the legal system—to provide relief that
was not available at trial because a fact exists which was not known at
that time and relief is not available on appeal because it is not in the record.206

Importantly, coram nobis affords the convicted defendant the procedural option of presenting a claim that the conviction was tainted when the
prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, as required by the Supreme Court of the United States in Brady v. Maryland 207 and subsequent
202. Wells v. State, 2017 Ark. 88, at 6, 513 S.W.3d 834, 837. At trial the defendant argued that the evidence failed to show he intended to kill, and thus, that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder because he did not know the victim
and only fired randomly. Id., 513 S.W.3d at 837. Because he had not claimed that he was not
the individual who fired, his identity was not in issue and the court rejected his claim that the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order DNA testing. Id., 513 S.W.3d at 837. The
supreme court concluded: “A request for DNA testing raised now to assert a claim of actual
innocence would not produce new material evidence that would support Wells’s theory of
defense presented at trial, nor would it raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit
the offense, particularly in light of his confession to the contrary.” Id., 513 S.W.3d at 837.
203. 2014 Ark. 288, 436 S.W.3d 469.
204. Id. at 2, 436 S.W.3d at 471.
205. 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426 (1984).
206. Id. at 573–74, 670 S.W.2d at 428.
207. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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Brady decisions;208 when the defendant was insane at the time of trial;209
when his guilty plea was coerced;210 or when a third party confesses to the
crime while the defendant’s conviction is pending on appeal.211
A showing that evidence favorable to the defense was suppressed, or
not disclosed while in the possession or under control of the prosecutor or
members of the prosecution team, may be the subject of extraordinary relief
by writ of error coram nobis only if the Arkansas Supreme Court orders
jurisdiction reinvested in the trial court to consider the claim on its merits if
the case has been appealed.212 If the defendant has been convicted on a plea
of guilty, however, the writ may be filed directly in the trial court because
that court never lost jurisdiction since there was no appeal.213 Coram nobis is

208. E.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 285 n.27 (1999) (where prosecutor relies on
open file policy arguably disclosing all evidence known to State is available to the defense,
the defendant is not charged with duty to make an additional search for undisclosed evidence
favorable to defense); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436–37 (1995) (undisclosed favorable
evidence must be considered cumulatively in determining whether there was a reasonable
probability of a different outcome had all favorable evidence been disclosed to defense);
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 668 (1985) (material impeachment evidence must be
disclosed to defense); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (no duty for defense
counsel to make request for specific evidence not known to defendant because of the disclosure duty imposed upon prosecutor).
209. See Hydrick v. State, 104 Ark. 43, 45, 148 S.W. 541, 541–42 (1912) (citing Johnson
v. State, 97 Ark. 131, 133 S.W. 596 (1911)). More recently, in Graham v. State, the court
held that an allegation that the petitioner was incompetent at the time he entered his plea of
guilty is cognizable in coram nobis, but may not be raised under the habeas corpus remedy
for newly discovered scientific evidence supporting a claim of actual innocence under Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 to -203. 358 Ark. 296, 298, 188 S.W.3d 893, 895
(2004).
210. The Arkansas Supreme Court has distinguished between a claim based on coercion
of a defendant’s guilty plea, cognizable in coram nobis, and a challenge to the conviction on a
guilty plea based upon counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to properly advise the pleading
defendant with respect to the consequences of pleading guilty. The former situation may
warrant relief if the defendant was actually threatened harm into pleading guilty or his guilty
plea was entered under fear or duress, according to White v. State, 2015 Ark. 151, at 5, 460
S.W.3d 285, 288. But where the allegation rests on a claim that counsel failed to advise the
defendant pleading guilty correctly, the claim is actually a postconviction attack on the conviction that must be brought in Rule 37. Id., 460 S.W.3d at 288–89. In Thacker v. State, the
court also explained, “Claims of coercion cognizable in error coram nobis proceedings include pleas that are the result of fear, duress, or threats of mob violence.” 2016 Ark. 315, at 6,
500 S.W.3d 736, 740.
211. Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 573–74, 670 S.W.2d 426, 427–29.
212. Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539, at 5, 364 S.W.3d 61, 65. The court specifically
applied the test for establishing a Brady violation in the context of a petition to reinvest the
trial court with jurisdiction to consider Newman’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. Id. at
18–19, 364 S.W.3d at 71.
213. Noble v. State, 2015 Ark. 141, at 5, 460 S.W.3d 774, 778.
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a judicial remedy,214 recently expanded by decisions in Strawhacker v.
State215 and Pitts v. State,216 in which the supreme court held that disclosure
by the FBI that criminalists testifying as experts had testified falsely in some
trials, warranted review by the trial courts in those cases to determine
whether false expert testimony compromised in the integrity of the convictions.217
These decisions expand the underlying premise for the remedy because
they recognize that the remedy may lead to evidence demonstrating a constitutional non-disclosure violation, even though the petitioner remains unable
to present evidence establishing the suppression or non-disclosure of evidence that would have been favorable to the defense.218 Even if the petitioner is able to demonstrate the undisclosed evidence would have been favorable to the petitioner in developing or supporting a defense at trial, the petitioner may not be entitled to relief from the conviction. The required showing for relief mirrors that for Brady violations as a matter of federal constitutional law. Relief from the conviction depends upon a showing that there
would have been a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the
undisclosed or suppressed evidence been available to the defendant at trial.219
Procedurally, the most significant aspect of the coram nobis process is
that once the trial court has lost jurisdiction over the case after the time for
motion for new trial or notice of appeal—thirty days—has expired, the petitioner seeking review of claims cognizable in coram nobis must petition the
Arkansas Supreme Court for leave to reinvest jurisdiction in the circuit
214. For the history of the writ of coram nobis in Arkansas, see John H. Haley, Coram
Nobis and the Convicted Innocent, 9 ARK. L. REV. 118 (1955). The coram nobis remedy is
criticized in Doug Ward, Post Conviction Remedies in Arkansas: What’s a Lawyer to Do?,
28 ARK. LAW. 23, 25 (1994) (“This remedy is little used because it is rarely useful.”). For an
extensive discussion of the current state of the coram nobis remedy in Arkansas, see J.
Thomas Sullivan, Brady-Based Prosecution Misconduct Claims, Buckley, and the Arkansas
Coram Nobis Remedy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 561, 610–45 (2011). The discussion includes a thorough comparison of the Rule 37 and coram nobis remedies under state law. Id.
215. 2015 Ark. 263, 2015 WL 352639.
216. 2016 Ark. 345, 501 S.W.3d 803.
217. Id. at 3–4, 501 S.W.3d at 805–06; Strawhacker, 2015 Ark. 263, at 1–2, 2015 WL
352639, at *1.
218. For example, in Buckley v. State, the petitioner learned that state law enforcement
officers had videotaped an interview with the confidential informant prior to trial. No. CR 01644, 2007 WL 2955980, at *4 (Ark. Oct. 11, 2007). The videotape had never been disclosed
because the drug agents themselves concluded that the videotape contained no exculpatory
evidence requiring disclosure. Id. Buckley petitioned for coram nobis, but because the videotape had not been disclosed, he was unable to show that it did contain evidence warranting
relief. Id. (“Although petitioner’s attempts to obtain the tape demonstrate diligence in pursuing this issue, he does not present a claim that is meritorious.”).
219. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435–37 (1995).
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court.220 If the supreme court grants the petitioner’s motion, the petition for
coram nobis relief can be presented to the trial court. If the trial court orders
relief, the State may appeal; if relief is denied on the petition, the petitioner
can appeal to the supreme court.
IV. PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHIFT IN RULE 37.1 APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
The shift in appellate jurisdiction in Rule 37.1 appeals, ordered in the
Barnes footnote, redirecting review of the trial court’s denial of relief from
the Arkansas Supreme Court to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, results in a
significant additional option, and burden, for state inmates challenging their
convictions. The general framework for appellate review in Rule 37.1 actions imposes a duty on postconviction litigants to petition the Arkansas
Supreme Court to review cases in which the court of appeals has ruled adversely on the claims.
A.

The Additional Step in the Appellate Process: The Petition for Review221

Pursuant to the rules governing the direct appeal process under Arkansas law, a petitioner, losing in the court of appeals, has the options of petitioning for rehearing in that court,222 or petitioning for review of the case in
220. Mason v. State, 2014 Ark. 288, at 1, 436 S.W.3d 469, 470.
221. On March 14, 2019, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted new rules that alter the
process for filing the petition for review in the state supreme court to review a decision rendered by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. In re Electronic Filing of Petitions for Rehearing &
Petitions for Review, 2019 Ark. 79, ___ S.W.3d ___. Either party losing in the intermediate
court may petition the supreme court for reconsideration the issues urged by the losing party.
Id., ___ S.W.3d ___. If the petition for review filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 2-4 is
granted, the court traditionally reviews the issue on which review has been granted de novo,
rather than reviewing the decision of the court of appeals for error. The revised rule permits a
losing party to file the petition for review within ten days of the denial of a petition for rehearing when the party has petitioned the court of appeals for rehearing. Id., ___ S.W.3d ___.
Alternatively, in the event the losing party does not petition for rehearing in the court of
appeals, the additional ten-day filing period commences when the time for filing the petition
for rehearing has run, eighteen days from the issuance of the decision by the court of appeals.
See id., ___ S.W.3d ___.
222. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-3. Under Rule 2-3(a), the losing litigant in the court of appeals
has eighteen calendar days from the date of decision to file a petition for rehearing. ARK. SUP.
CT. R. 2-3(a). Under subsection (g), the “petition for rehearing should be used to call attention to specific errors of law or fact which the opinion is thought to contain.” ARK. SUP. CT.
R. 2-3(g). The rehearing process is not designed to simply reassert the argument on appeal,
although it may certainly point to the court’s failure to properly consider precedent. See
White v. State, No. CR 07-312, 2007 WL 4261535, at *1 (Ark. Dec. 6, 2007) (“A petition for
rehearing should be used to call attention to specific errors of law or fact which the opinion is
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the state supreme court.223 This means that the redirection of the appeal from
denial of relief in a Rule 37 postconviction action transforms the process
from a one-step appeal to a two-step appeal, with the latter being a discretionary step in which the supreme court will exercise its discretion in deciding whether to review the case.224
thought to contain and not to repeat arguments already considered and rejected by this court.
Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 2-3(g).”). Counsel may not use the petition to assert new claims or issues not
presented to the court in the opening appellate brief, e.g., Pannell v. State, 320 Ark. 390, 897
S.W.2d 552 (1995), but counsel arguably could assert the impact of an intervening decision
or rule issued by a higher court that should serve to change the disposition on appeal by rehearing.
223. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4. A party losing in the court of appeals may petition for review
in the state supreme court either with filing for rehearing or without petitioning for rehearing
in the court of appeals. Id. Under the revised rule, the losing party may file the petition for
review simultaneously with the petition for rehearing or within ten days after the court of
appeals rules on the rehearing petition or the date on which the petition for rehearing was due
to be filed in the court of appeals. In re Electronic Filing of Petitions for Rehearing & Petitions for Review, 2019 Ark. 79, ___ S.W.3d ___.
The petition for review must be based on one of the following grounds set forth in Rule 24(c):
A petition for review must allege one of the following: (i) the case was decided
in the Court of Appeals by a tie vote, (ii) the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which is in conflict with a prior holding of a published opinion of either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, or (iii) the Court of Appeals otherwise
erred with respect to one of the grounds listed in Rule 1-2(b).
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(c). The grounds on which the petition for review may be urged include
the following:
(1) issues of first impression,
(2) issues upon which there is a perceived inconsistency in the decisions of the
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court,
(3) issues involving federal constitutional interpretation,
(4) issues of substantial public interest,
(5) significant issues needing clarification or development of the law, or overruling of precedent, and
(6) appeals involving substantial questions of law concerning the validity, construction, or interpretation of an act of the General Assembly, ordinance of a municipality or county, or a rule or regulation of any court, administrative agency,
or regulatory body.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b).
224. Unlike the process used in other jurisdictions, once the supreme court elects to take a
case for review on appeal, it approaches the issues raised de novo, rather than engaging in a
review of the decision rendered by the court of appeals for error. Castaneda v. Progressive
Classic Ins. Co., 357 Ark. 345, 350, 166 S.W.3d 556, 560 (2004) (“When this court grants a
petition for review of a decision by the court of appeals, we review the appeal as if it had
been originally filed in this court.”). However, in Scissom v. State, the court cited Castaneda
for the usual proposition, but did so in language suggesting that it actually was reviewing the
decision of the intermediate court:
Appellee, the State of Arkansas, petitions for review from a court of appeals’ decision to reverse and remand the Pope County Circuit Court’s order that extended appellant’s probation by ordering him to serve twelve months in the Regional
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For the pro se petitioner, this second layer of review means that a second pleading must be prepared and filed in the state supreme court within an
eighteen-day period, or within ten days following time for filing a petition
for rehearing or disposition on a petition for review by the Arkansas court of
appeals,225 in order to completely exhaust the process of appellate review in
the Arkansas system.226 This time frame may prove particularly troubling
because the petitioner will be incarcerated in the Department of Correction,
perhaps resulting in limited access to the library resources, which may be
necessary in order to frame the grounds urged in the petition for review and
administrative delays in use of the postal system.
There is an additional consideration for pro se petitioners, as well as
those represented by counsel. Under Rule 2-4(a), the petition for review
“may be typewritten and shall not exceed three 8 ½” x 11”, double-spaced
pages in length.”227 This extreme limitation on the length of the petition imposes a significant burden of framing the issues in terms of the brevity demanded by the supreme court, particularly if multiple colorable issues have
been urged in the direct appeal and rejected by the court of appeals. The
burden is eased, to some extent, by the express provision in Rule 2-4(b),
which permits the party petitioning for review to attach a copy of a petition
for rehearing by the court of appeals to the three-page petition for review.228
The petition for rehearing is limited by Rule 2-3(e)229 to ten pages, “including the style of the case and certificate of counsel.”230 Consequently, a litigant filing a petition for review may expand upon the three page limitation
Punishment Facility as an additional condition of probation, with credit to be
given for time already served. See Scissom v. State, 94 Ark. App. 452, 232
S.W.3d 502 (2006). We granted the State’s petition for review pursuant to Ark.
Sup. Ct. R. 2-4(e) and (f)(2006). We affirm the court of appeals’ decision for resentencing, and we reverse and remand to the circuit court for sentencing under
the proper statutes.
367 Ark. 368, 368, 240 S.W.3d 100, 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
225. For discussion of new rule regarding time for filing petition for review, see supra
note 223.
226. The rule governing the issuance of the court’s mandate following the conclusion of
an appeal likely must be amended to reflect the reassignment of appellate jurisdiction in Rule
37.1 actions to the court of appeals. See ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(h), Reporter’s Notes (2001)
(referring to the exhaustion of state remedies in the context of subsequent federal habeas
corpus petitions and stating that “the exhaustion doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry
into what procedures are ‘available’ under state law”).
227. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(a). However, any party may request leave of the supreme court
to file a supplemental brief pursuant to Rule 2-4(f) once the court grants a petition to review
the case. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(f).
228. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(b).
229. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-3(e).
230. The “certificate of counsel” refers to the statement that the petition for rehearing is
not filed for purposes of delay. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-3(a). Presumably, a pro se filing must
include a similar certificate.
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for the petition for review by simultaneously filing, within the applicable
time period for filing either pleading, by attaching a copy of the petition for
rehearing to the petition for review. For the pro se litigant, however, this
process may not only be confusing, but also involve some considerable difficulty because it entails the filing of both the rehearing and review petitions.
B.

Appointment of Counsel in the Postconviction Process

For those inmates represented by counsel, who may, in fact, be appointed by the circuit court to represent an indigent petitioner,231 a different
question raised by the change in appellate jurisdiction remains to be resolved. Counsel appointed to represent a Rule 37.1 petitioner are obligated
to continue their representation throughout the appeal from the circuit
court’s order disposing of the issues raised and litigated in that court.232 Rule
37.3 provides:
(b) If the original petition, or a motion for appointment of counsel should
allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the cost of the proceedings and
to employ counsel, and if the court is satisfied that the allegation is true,
the court may at its discretion appoint counsel for the petitioner for any
hearing held in the circuit court. If a petition on which the petitioner was
represented by counsel is denied, counsel shall continue to represent the
petitioner for an appeal to the Supreme Court, unless relieved as counsel
by the circuit court or the Supreme Court. If no hearing was held or the
petitioner proceeded pro se at the hearing, the circuit court may at its discretion appoint counsel for an appeal upon proper motion by the petitioner.233

Thus, counsel proceeding by appointment of a circuit court in a Rule 37.1
action may find themselves ethically obligated to not only represent the indigent petitioner in the trial court for purposes of conducting the evidentiary
hearing, but through the entire appellate process, as well.234
231. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.3(b).
232. Id.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. In Morgan v. State, the defendant argued in his pro se filing, that he had been denied
credit for jail time served prior to revocation of his probated sentence, filed when trial counsel moved to withdraw from further representation under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) and then-Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(j) (now, Rule 4-3(k)) based on counsel’s
contention that the appeal from revocation of probation would be meritless. 73 Ark. App.
107, 108, 42 S.W.3d 569, 570 (2001). The appellate court found that the denial of credit for
defendant’s prior confinement on two occasions while the probation remained in effect could
be corrected through a Rule 37 action. Id. at 110, 42 S.W.3d at 572. The court agreed with
counsel that the direct appeal was “without merit,” but declined to relieve counsel, explaining: “[B]ecause further relief regarding Mr. Morgan’s sentencing may be obtained from the
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The duty imposed by the ethical rules regarding termination of representation will require that counsel continue representation throughout the
appellate process following the circuit court’s ruling on the grounds asserted
in the petition, unless counsel is relieved of further obligation.235 Rule 16 of
the appellate rules in criminal cases specifically requires counsel representing the defendant on appeal to continue representation through the appellate
process “unless permitted by the trial court or the appellate court to withdraw in the interest of justice or for other sufficient cause.”236 The application of this approach to the filing of the petition for review in Rule 37.1 cases is not clear. Subsections (b) and (c) directly refer to the situation involving withdrawal of counsel in Rule 37.5 postconviction petitions, but these
are actions that are limited to capital prosecutions in which the death penalty
has been imposed.237 Otherwise, there is no general rule governing counsel’s
representation in Rule 37.1 litigation. Subsection (a), for instance, references
counsel’s duty when a “notice of appeal of a judgment of conviction has
trial court, we decline to relieve his counsel from representation.” Id. at 111, 42 S.W.3d at
572.
235. ARK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16. The rule generally provides that counsel may not
withdraw from representation except under circumstances identified in subsection (b), one of
which recognizes withdrawal when continuing representation will impose an “unreasonable
financial burden” on counsel. ARK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(6). Even when counsel is
permitted to withdraw from representation, subsections (c) and (d) require counsel to protect
the client’s position in the representation:
(c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission
of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for
terminating the representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may
retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
ARK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c)–(d).
The rule does not recognize counsel’s assessment of the client’s position as unlikely to be
successful as a basis for withdrawal, although subsection (b)(7) authorizes termination of the
relationship with the client if “other good cause for withdrawal exists.” ARK. R. PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(7). This provision would apparently authorize withdrawal if counsel
believes the claim urged by the client is frivolous or does not reflect “a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” ARK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1.
236. ARK. R. APP. P.–CRIM. 16. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Trial counsel, whether retained or court-appointed, shall continue to represent
a convicted defendant throughout any appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court or
Arkansas Court of Appeals, unless permitted by the trial court or the appellate
court to withdraw in the interest of justice or for other sufficient cause.
Id.
237. ARK. R. APP. P.–CRIM. 16(b)–(c).
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been filed with the trial court,”238 which deals with the direct appeal from a
conviction at trial, not a postconviction action.
Moreover, counsel appointed to undertake or continue representation
may be unfairly burdened because the circuit court appointing counsel under
Rule 37.3(b) has no authority to order compensation for counsel’s services.
In Arkansas Public Defender Commission v. Greene County Circuit
Court,239 the supreme court held that the circuit court’s order that the Public
Defender Commission reimburse trial counsel for representation in a Rule
37.1 proceeding was invalid.240 Relying on case law holding that postconviction proceedings are civil in nature,241 rather than criminal matters, and that
the Commission is not statutorily liable for compensation for representation
in civil proceedings,242 the court rejected the trial court’s authority to order
compensation for postconviction counsel.243
In contrast, the circuit court appointing an indigent capital defendant in
a Rule 37.5244 postconviction action in a case in which a death sentence has
been imposed does have the authority to order compensation of appointed
counsel in “such rates or amounts as the courts determine to be reasonable.”245 The authority for payment of compensation for counsel’s representation does not rest on any inherent authority of the circuit courts that might
be predicated on the fact that the death sentence had been imposed in the
238. ARK. R. APP. P.–CRIM. 16(a).
239. 343 Ark. 49, 32 S.W.3d 470 (2000). The court suggested that counsel providing
representation in a non-capital Rule 37 proceeding might seek compensation through the
Arkansas Claims Commission. Id. at 58, 32 S.W.3d at 476; accord Op. Ark. Att’y. Gen. No.
229 (2005). The Arkansas Claims Commission, which operates as a fact-finding body for the
Arkansas General Assembly, exists to consider monetary claims against the State that are
jurisdictionally-barred by the constitutional sovereign immunity provision. About the Commission,
ARK.
ST.
CLAIMS
COMMISSION,
https://arclaimscommission.arkansas.gov/AboutUs.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2019); see also
ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20. Claims that cannot be heard in the state courts can be brought before the Claims Commission for decision, ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-204(b)(2)(A) (West
2019), that is then subject to appeal to the General Assembly, ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-211
(West 2019).
240. Ark. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 343 Ark. at 58, 32 S.W.3d at 476.
241. Id. at 55–56, 32 S.W.3d at 474–75.
242. Id. at 52, 54–55, 32 S.W.3d at 474 (citing Ark. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Burnett, 340
Ark. 233, 238, 12 S.W.3d 191, 194 (2000)). The court also rejected trial counsel’s argument
that the trial court’s appointment ultimately required him to provide uncompensated representation constituted a violation of his right to due process. Id. at 57–58, 32 S.W.3d at 476. But it
did not actually address counsel’s due process claim on the merits; rather, the court simply
ruled that because counsel had offered no convincing authority in support of his claim, it
would not address its merits, consistent with the court’s traditional view. Id., 32 S.W.3d at
476.
243. Id. at 57, 32 S.W.3d at 475–76.
244. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5.
245. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(j).
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petitioner’s case, but rather, on statutory authority expressly authorizing
compensation of capital counsel.246
The limitation upon the circuit court’s authority to order payment of
compensation for counsel appointed to represent petitioners pursuing Rule
37.1 relief reflects the difficult predicament for indigent criminal defendants
typically forced to proceed pro se, without professional assistance, in challenging their convictions or sentences on the basis of ineffective representation on the part of trial counsel. This situation may readily compromise the
Arkansas defendant seeking to challenge representation by trial or appellate
counsel as a matter of the federal constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel promised by the Sixth Amendment.247
However, the problem posed by lack of representation for indigent defendants has been addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Martinez v. Ryan248 and Trevino v. Thaler.249 The Court recognized the difficulty faced by indigent postconviction litigants challenging representation
provided by counsel at trial and in the initial step in the direct appeal process
as ineffective.250 Generally, defendants are advised that the ineffective assistance challenge almost always should be raised in the postconviction process.251 The limited exception to the rule arises when the issue has been
raised and fully litigated by motion for new trial, permitting the development of the necessary record for full review of counsel’s representation,
including counsel’s disclosure of strategic considerations for decisions made
in the conduct of the case.252
In Martinez, the Court held procedural default of the ineffective assistance claim could be excused by the federal habeas court when it resulted
from the petitioner’s failure to assert counsel’s ineffectiveness in the first
step in postconviction process where Arizona law mandated that the claim
be raised at that point or lost.253 Subsequently, in Trevino, the Court extend246. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-202(f) (West 2019) (as referenced in section (j) of Rule
37.5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure).
247. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
248. 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
249. 569 U.S. 413 (2013).
250. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel claims should typically be litigated in postconviction proceedings).
251. See, e.g., Lasiter v. State, 290 Ark. 96, 97, 717 S.W.2d 198, 199 (1986) (“Ordinarily
we do not consider a charge of ineffectiveness when a case is first appealed, for the facts
relevant to that issue have not been developed.”).
252. See, e.g., Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 507, 863 S.W.2d 813, 818 (1993) (where
claim of ineffective assistance raised in motion for new trial, record of evidentiary hearing
permits review of claim on direct appeal).
253. 566 U.S. at 17 (“Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not
bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if,
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ed the excuse for procedural default to those ineffective assistance claims
litigated in state postconvictions without benefit of effective assistance of
counsel in that process, regardless of whether the state required the claim to
be raised in the postconviction process.254 With respect to a claim based on
asserted failure of trial or direct appeal counsel to perform effectively, these
cases support a requirement for effective assistance for the postconviction
litigant whose Sixth Amendment claim would otherwise be defaulted because it could not, or should not, have been brought in the direct appeal.
This development is significant for state court defendants petitioning for
federal habeas relief who have been forced to proceed without benefit of
counsel or face procedural default of their claims.
V. EXHAUSTION OF STATE COURT REMEDIES AND REVIEW OF FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The significance of the change in appellate jurisdiction is particularly
apparent in the obligation for litigants raising claims regarding federal constitutional violations to exhaust available state remedies prior to seeking
relief from adverse decisions in federal actions. The state court defendant
whose federal constitutional claims have been rejected by state courts has
two options for seeking relief in the federal system for violations. The defendant may petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of
certiorari to review the state court disposition in the direct appeal process255
or from a decision on a federal claim initially litigated in state postconviction process.256 The Barnes footnote clearly addressed appellate review of

in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding
was ineffective.”).
254. 569 U.S. at 423.
255. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2018). The petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a
state court decision rendered by the highest court of a State is characterized by the Court as
the final step in the direct appeal process, with the ruling on the certiorari petition serving to
finalize, or conclude, the direct appeal process. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6
(1987) (“By ‘final,’ we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition
for certiorari finally denied.”).
256. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328. Section 1257(a) authorizes review of a decision of the
“highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” which includes a decision rendered in an action for postconviction litigated in the state court process. See, e.g., Hinton v.
Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014). The Court reviewed an ineffective assistance claim initially
raised in state postconviction proceedings in which the evidence at the hearing showed that
trial counsel had refused the trial court’s offer to provide additional funding for the defense to
obtain the assistance of a qualified expert on ballistics. Id. at 270. Three highly qualified
experts testified that the unqualified “expert” called at trial failed to properly contest the
prosecution’s theory of defendant’s involvement in the capital murder, supporting the Court’s

2019]

RULE 37.1 POST-CONVICTION APPEALS

369

Rule 37.1 challenges that include claimed violations of federal constitutionally-protected rights, expressly the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Rejection of a Rule 37.1 petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the state postconviction process may be addressed
in a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States
seeking review of the ruling of the Arkansas Supreme Court upholding denial of relief by the trial court.257
The state court defendant may also seek relief on a claimed violation of
a federal constitutional right in the federal habeas corpus process, pursuant
to the federal habeas corpus statute.258 This remedy is significantly restricted, but may essentially be used by a state court defendant to assert a violation of federal constitutional protections in state court proceedings preserved
in the state appeal or postconviction process.259 While direct review in the
Supreme Court of the United States is not limited by the same restrictions as
federal habeas actions, review is discretionary and the chances that the
Court will grant review in any particular case are extremely remote.260 The
Court itself provides the relevant data on its website: “The Court receives
approximately 7,000-8,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari each Term. The
Court grants and hears oral argument in about 80 cases.” 261

conclusion that trial counsel’s decision not to accept the offered funding resulted in effective
assistance. Id.
257. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). In fact, ineffective
assistance claims are the primary claims raised in Rule 37.1 proceedings. See Howard v.
State, 367 Ark. 18, 51, 238 S.W.3d 24, 49 (2006) (Hannah, C.J., dissenting).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018).
259. A claim that has not been preserved for review on the merits in state court proceedings, whether in the state direct appeal or state postconviction process, will likely be barred
from review on the merits in the federal habeas process. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362
(2002) (application of state procedural default rule to bar review on the merits, if routinely
and fairly applied, will serve as adequate and independent determination on claim barring
federal habeas review on the merits); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–53 (1991)
(procedural default of federal constitutional claim bars review on the merits in federal habeas
litigation).
260. There is no requirement that the state court defendant petition the Supreme Court of
the United States to issue the writ of certiorari on a federal constitutional claim prior to petitioning for federal habeas corpus relief, nor does the Court’s denial of a petition for writ of
certiorari serve as a decision on the merits that would bar relief on a federal constitutional
claim asserted in a habeas action. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456 (1953); Smith v. Baldi,
344 U.S. 561, 565 (1953).
261. Frequently Asked Questions: General Information, SUP. CT. U.S.,
www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq_general.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
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State Court Dispositions as a Prerequisite for Federal Review

Federal review typically rests on a threshold disposition of the federal
constitutional claim in state proceedings.262 Consequently, the redirection of
Rule 37.1 appellate review to the Arkansas Court of Appeals not only alters
the framework for available state court remedies for those federal constitutional claims, it also imposes an additional obligation upon state court litigants to file for review in the state supreme court when the intermediate
court rejects the defendant’s arguments. The Rule 37.1 applicant must petition for review to fully exhaust state remedies, at least in theory. Section
2254 expressly commands:
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.263

Subsection (c) is unequivocal in its directive, meaning that the Arkansas
Rule 37.1 petitioner will be required to petition the state supreme court for
review of any decision rendered by the court of appeals rejecting the claim
for relief for violation of a federally-protected procedural right.
Failure to petition for review in the Arkansas Supreme Court would
mean that the Rule 37 petitioner had simply failed to raise his federal constitutional claim of ineffective assistance, much as if the petitioner had not
sought review by Rule 37 at all in challenging counsel’s effectiveness.264
Similarly, a federal petition including a claim of a Brady-disclosure violation would have to be exhausted by the litigant by moving for leave in the

262. The State might affirmatively waive the requirement that the federal constitutional
claim first be litigated fully in state proceedings in a federal habeas corpus action as a matter
of strategy in order to avoid delay in reaching the decision on the merits of the claim in the
federal action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (“A State shall not be deemed to have waived the
exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State,
through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.”).
263. Id. § 2254(c) (emphasis added).
264. With respect to ineffective assistance claims, the Court’s decisions in Trevino and
Martinez allow the indigent litigant unable to afford representation in the postconviction
process an excuse for procedural default in failing to pursue available remedies in state court
for challenging counsel’s effectiveness in representation. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413
(2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). The unanswered question would be whether an
Arkansas petitioner failing to petition for review from the adverse decision by the court of
appeals on appeal from denial of Rule 37.1 relief would be extended the benefit of Martinez
and Trevino in excusing the failure to fully exhaust that remedy available under the Arkansas
rules.
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Arkansas Supreme Court to reinvest the trial court of conviction with jurisdiction to consider the litigant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis.265
Moreover, the requirement for exhaustion of state court remedies requires that the petitioner not combine exhausted and unexhausted claims of
constitutional violations in the petition for federal habeas relief. In Rose v.
Lundy,266 the Court issued a critical decision requiring federal habeas courts
to dismiss petitions including claims not previously litigated in appropriate
state process, whether on appeal or in state postconviction proceedings.267
The Court’s reasoning rested on the value for federal courts to respect state
court determinations of federal constitutional issues raised in state prosecutions, recognizing that state courts are obligated to enforce federal constitutional protections.268 The Court explained:
Because “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a
federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,” federal
courts apply the doctrine of comity, which “teaches that one court should
defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of
another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of
the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” 269

Thus, the exhaustion requirement, according to Rose, reflects the comity
principle by reducing “friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct
alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights.”270 In order to avoid dismissal
of the unexhausted claims or the mixed petition containing exhausted and
unexhausted claims, the petitioner may move to have the federal case held in
abeyance, permitting litigation of the claims in any state process which re265. For discussion regarding the coram nobis process under Arkansas law, see supra
Section III.D.4. However, a claim of newly-discovered scientific evidence establishing the
defendant’s innocence, a proper subject for litigation pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated
sections 16-112-201 to -203, is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus and, thus, the exhaustion question is essentially irrelevant with respect to the merits of such claims. See Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963). On the other
hand, the exhaustion of a remedy of this kind would appear to toll the time for filing the
federal petition. See Polson v. Bowersox, 595 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding habeas
corpus proceeding authorized by rule was a form of collateral review qualifying for tolling of
federal habeas filing period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c)). For discussion of the Arkansas statutory provision for relief based on newly discovered evidence, see supra Section III.D.3.
266. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
267. Id. at 522 (“[B]ecause a total exhaustion rule promotes comity and does not unreasonably impair the prisoner’s right to relief, we hold that a district court must dismiss habeas
petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.”).
268. Id. at 522 (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)).
269. Id. at 518 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)).
270. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981).
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main available to the petitioner for consideration on the merits by state
courts.271 Pursuant to the Court’s decision in Rhines v. Weber,272 the habeas
court may stay the federal proceedings while the petitioner attempts to exhaust state court remedies.273 Otherwise, a subsequent federal petition, raising issues litigated in state proceedings after the initial petition containing
only exhausted claims, would be barred under § 2254(b)(1), and would have
to be dismissed as an unauthorized successive petition,274 unless expressly
permitted by the court of appeals under extremely rare circumstances.275 The
circumstances either relate to a United States Supreme Court decision announcing a new rule held to apply retroactively to cases that have been finalized,276 or to the development of new facts that would warrant a conclusion
that no reasonable fact-finder would have found the defendant guilty of the
underlying offense.277
The operation of the statute effectively prevents an Arkansas postconviction petitioner from raising claims of constitutional violations, including
ineffective assistance of counsel, in successive federal habeas corpus petitions. The petitioner cannot, for instance, claim a violation of a procedural
protection and then later claim that counsel was ineffective if the federal
habeas court finds that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Prior to pursuing federal relief, however, an Arkansas defendant might assert a defaulted
claim on direct appeal from the conviction, and once the appellate court
declines to review it on the merits based on counsel’s failure to preserve
error, the defendant may present an ineffective assistance claim in a Rule
37.1 petition following affirmance of the conviction on appeal.278
271. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2018) (“An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”).
272. 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
273. Id. at 278.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2018) (“Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate
court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”).
275. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A)–(E), (b)(4).
276. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
277. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
278. The Arkansas Supreme Court expressed its hostility to this process in its seminal
opinion, Wicks v. State, rejecting reliance on plain or fundamental error theories for review of
defaulted claims on the merits in the direct appeal process:
In closing, we mention a position sometimes taken in appellate briefs in criminal
cases, that a possible error should be argued by counsel even in the absence of an
objection below, because the matter might be raised in a petition for postconviction relief. The short answer to that suggestion is that if the supposed error actually calls for postconviction relief, the defect is not cured by the presentation of
an argument that is certain to be rejected by this court for want of an objection at
the trial. Nevertheless, if counsel insist upon consuming their time and that of the

2019]
B.

RULE 37.1 POST-CONVICTION APPEALS

373

The Boerckel Rule: The Requirement for Full Exhaustion of State
Remedies

In O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,279 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that complete or full exhaustion of state court remedies was required
before state court defendants could assert claims arising from the protections
afforded by the Constitution in federal proceedings.280 The holding specifically addressed the requirement in the federal habeas corpus statute,281 that
“[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.”282 Because the option of petitioning a state supreme
court for discretionary review of a decision rejecting a federal constitutional
claim by an intermediate appellate court constitutes an “available procedure,” the decision requires the federal habeas petitioner to have petitioned
for review in the state discretionary review process in order to meet the exhaustion requirement of § 2254(c).283
Prior to the Court’s decision in Boerckel, several federal courts had declined to hold that the exhaustion requirement includes the filing of a petition for discretionary review in a state supreme court for purposes of federal
habeas jurisdiction.284 The Court’s holding in Boerckel resolved the conflict

court in making such an unsupported argument, the argument should be preceded
by a clear statement that no appropriate objection was made below and that the
point is being presented despite that omission.
270 Ark. 781, 786, 606 S.W.2d 366, 370 (1980) (emphasis added). The court’s approach
ignores the fact that its rejection of the unpreserved claim will serve to support the postconviction claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to protect the record,
arguably meeting Strickland’s first prong of the Sixth Amendment claim in showing defective performance in the representation. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
279. 526 U.S. 838 (1999).
280. Id. at 842.
281. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
282. Id. § 2254(c).
283. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848–49.
284. See Boerckel v. O’Sullivan, 135 F.3d 1194, 1199–1200 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1998); Dolny
v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1994) (discretionary review in Minnesota Supreme
Court not necessary for exhaustion of claim); Buck v. Green, 743 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir.
1984) (Georgia Supreme Court’s limited jurisdiction in discretionary appeals does not obligate state inmate to present claim in discretionary petition in order to assert claim in federal
habeas). The Seventh Circuit had noted that other circuits had held to the contrary with respect to this exhaustion issue. Boerckel, 135 F.3d at 1199 n.2. (citing Jennison v. Goldsmith,
940 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (exhaustion of claim for Arizona inmate
requires presentation of claim in petition for discretionary review); Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d
117, 119 (2d Cir. 1991) (exhaustion requires petition for discretionary review of claims subsequently asserted in federal habeas petition); Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 431–32
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in requiring full exhaustion of available state remedies, including the petition for discretionary review in a state’s supreme court, when this level of
review is provided for by state postconviction procedure. At the same time,
it left undisturbed the possibility that such a level of discretionary review
might not be available in some states. It did not ultimately resolve the question of whether state courts could excuse exhaustion of state remedies on
federal constitutional claims as matters of state court policy.285
Boerckel argued that the Illinois Supreme Court’s language in Rule
315(a) expressly discouraged the filing of petitions for discretionary review
in the supreme court when the issues to be raised would be routine in nature.286 Rule 315(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Whether such a petition will be granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
court’s discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: the general importance of the question presented; the existence of a
conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the
Supreme Court, or of another division of the Appellate Court; the need
for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority; and the final or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed. 287

Since the court had discouraged the filing of discretionary review petitions
to exhaust state remedies prior to filing for federal review in “routine” cases,
Boerckel argued that he should not be required to file what the state court
had suggested would amount to a futile filing. Based on Rule 315(a)’s limiting language, the discretionary review process, in this sense, would be “unavailable” to a petitioner who could not show that his claim qualified for
review under the terms of the Rule.288
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, read the language of
§ 2254(c) strictly, as requiring exhaustion of any process made available
under state law, regardless of whether the exhaustion might be futile in
terms of seeking to overturn state court precedent on a federal constitutional

(5th Cir. 1985) (petition for discretionary review by Texas Court of Criminal Appeals requisite for exhaustion of federal habeas claims)).
285. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 847–48. The Court observed:
The exhaustion doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry into what procedures are “available” under state law. In sum, there is nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requiring federal
courts to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available.
Id. The unresolved issue lies in determining when a state, by rule or law, has declared that a
petition for discretionary review is “not available.”
286. Id. at 846–47.
287. ILCS S. CT. R. 315 (addressing discretionary review, noting that review may be
available as a “matter of right” in certain circumstances).
288. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 846–47.
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claim.289 When confronted by this concern based on increased state court
filings, the Court seemingly dismissed the issue as insignificant:
We acknowledge that the rule we announce today—requiring state prisoners to file petitions for discretionary review when that review is part of
the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State—has the potential to
increase the number of filings in state supreme courts. We also recognize
that this increased burden may be unwelcome in some state courts because the courts do not wish to have the opportunity to review constitutional claims before those claims are presented to a federal habeas
court.290

The Court’s willingness to force state litigants to exhaust seemingly futile
state court remedies and the concomitant burden imposed on state courts of
last resort, stems from the Court’s overriding concern with comity. It explained: “By requiring state prisoners to give the Illinois Supreme Court the
opportunity to resolve constitutional errors in the first instance, the rule we
announce today serves the comity interests that drive the exhaustion doctrine.”291
The Court’s position in Boerckel has an important consequence for Arkansas postconviction litigants proceeding without assistance of counsel.
The requirement for complete exhaustion imposed by the Supreme Court of
the United States means that the Arkansas petitioner proceeding without
counsel in the required petition for review of a federal constitutional claim,
most commonly based on ineffective assistance of counsel, must completely
exhaust state remedies by filing the petition for review in the state supreme
court in order to fully exhaust a claim rejected by the Arkansas Court of
Appeals on appeal from denial of Rule 37.1 relief. Even when the Arkansas
petitioner preserves an ineffective assistance claim in the Rule 37.1 petition
filed in the trial court, complete exhaustion will require the defendant to not
only preserve the claim on appeal to the court of appeals, but also, to then
petition the state supreme court to review the claim once it has been rejected
by the intermediate court.
289. Id. at 847–48.
290. Id. at 847.
291. Id. at 846. There is, of course, some inconsistency in directing state courts to consider marginally colorable claims presented in petitions for discretionary review in order to
respect the notion of comity, in light of the Court’s explanation that its rule rested on respect
for state court process.
Because “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court
to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,” federal courts apply the doctrine of comity, which “teaches that one court
should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
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Ultimately, the Martinez/Trevino principle will, in theory, enable those
Arkansas petitioners who have been forced to proceed pro se in the Rule
37.1 appeal process, including filing the petition for review in the supreme
court, to claim the excuse from procedural default in failing to file the petition for review afforded by the Court in Trevino. However, the Court’s recent decision in Davila v. Davis292 limits application of the Martinez/Trevino
rule to claims of ineffective assistance based on trial counsel’s defective
performance and does not afford an excuse for procedural default based on
appellate counsel’s failure to properly argue issues that would arguably require relief on appeal.293 To the extent that a pro se Rule 37.1 petitioner’s
failure to petition for review by the Arkansas Supreme Court following rejection of the federal constitutional claim by the Arkansas Court of Appeals
would result in a failure to exhaust state remedies, this omission would appear to be excused by application of the Martinez/Trevino rationale.
C.

Ineffective Assistance Claims and the Petition for Review

The rule applied in Boerckel requires the Arkansas Rule 37.1 petitioner
asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to petition the state supreme court for review of a decision rendered by the court of appeals rejecting the claim urged on appeal from the denial of relief ordered by the trial
court of conviction. This two-step process for exhaustion of the usual appellate process in Arkansas appeals, predicated on the filing of the petition for
review pursuant to Rule 2-4, would appear to apply to appeal in Rule 37.1
actions.294
1.

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Construction of Rule 1-2(b)

The reassignment of appellate review in Rule 37.1 appeals from the
Arkansas Supreme Court to the court of appeals, particularly with respect to
appeals including ineffective assistance of counsel claims, raises a question
of the propriety of filing the petition for review in the supreme court once
the court of appeals has disposed of the ineffective assistance claims. The
context in which the propriety of the petition for review arises, Rule 24(c)295 requires a showing of one of three grounds: a tie vote in the court of
appeals; a court of appeals decision in conflict with published precedent; or

292. 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017).
293. See supra text accompanying note 106.
294. As of May 15, 2019, the author has found no decisions of the Arkansas Supreme
Court indicating that it had either granted or denied review on a Rule 37.1 appeal that had
been decided by the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
295. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4. For text of Rule 2-4(c), see supra note 223.
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a claim that the court of appeals erred in disposing of a ground set forth in
Rule 1-2(b).296
With respect to Rule 37.1 appeals presenting ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, Rule 1-2(b), which provides for review of “issues involving
federal constitutional interpretation,”297 would appear to include review of
ineffectiveness claims that arise under the Sixth Amendment298 and involve
application of Strickland v. Washington.299 However, in at least two unpublished decisions, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that ineffective
assistance claims are not within the purview of Rule 2-4. In Munn v. State,300
the defendant filed a petition for review after the court of appeals rejected
his argument that appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance on
direct appeal.301 In declining to review his ineffective assistance point raised
in his pro se Rule 2-4 petition, the supreme court explained:
We find no ground pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-4(c) to grant the petition for review. The rule provides that review will not be granted without
a showing by the petitioner that the decision of the court of appeals is in
conflict with a prior holding of a published opinion of either this court or
the court of appeals or that the court otherwise erred with respect to one
of the grounds enumerated in Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b). An assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether it pertains to trial or appellate
counsel, is not a grounds [sic] included in our rule, and none of the other
claims made by petitioner constitutes the requisite showing under the
rule.302

The per curiam order issued in Munn followed the supreme court’s reasoning in Murphy v. State.303 There, the court explained:
Petitioner Murphy’s sole ground for seeking review of the court of appeals decision is the allegation that he was not afforded adequate representation by his attorney on appeal. A claim of inadequate representation
is not one of the grounds set out in Rule 2-4(c). Such claims are within

296. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4; see also ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b). For text of Rule 1-2(b), see
supra note 16.
297. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b)(3).
298. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
299. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
300. No. CR 05-985, 2005 WL 2462251 (Ark. Oct. 6, 2005) (per curiam).
301. Id. at *1. The court of appeals also denied his pro se petition for rehearing. Munn v.
State, CACR 02-1246, 2005 WL 2093093 (Ark. App. Aug. 31, 2005).
302. Munn, 2005 WL 2462251, at *1.
303. Murphy v. State, No. CR 99-1388, 1999 WL 1212876 (Ark. Dec. 16, 1999), aff’g
No. CACR 99-375, 1999 WL 1051970 (Ark. App. Nov. 17, 1999). The Defendant filed a pro
se petition for review pursuant to Rule 2-4. Id. at *1.
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the purview of our postconviction rule, Criminal Procedure Rule
37.1(d). The petition is therefore denied.304

What is clear from these decisions is that both Munn and Murphy were attempting to litigate their ineffective assistance claims in the direct appeal
process, filing for review under Rule 2-4 after losing on their claims on appeal in the court of appeals.305 The supreme court declined to review these
claims on their merits, with the Murphy court expressly holding that ineffective assistance claims are deemed appropriate for litigation in Rule 37.1 proceedings.306 However, the court’s explanation of its rationale for declining
review of these claims is not precisely correct because the limitation on review actually flows from the list of generic claims included in Rule 12(b),307 as the court explained in Munn.308
The status of the decisions in Munn and Murphy as controlling precedent is somewhat questionable. First, the per curiam orders issued by the
state supreme court were not published when issued. Reliance on these opinions as precedent is precluded by the current version of Rule 5-2(c).309 Nevertheless, it is not clear what the current court would do with respect to these
prior, online-accessible statements that question whether Rule 2-4 petitions
would be subject to review in postconviction actions in which ineffective

304. Id. (emphasis added). But see cases cited supra notes 248–54 and accompanying
text. Claims of ineffective assistance may be litigated in the direct appeal following conviction when the record includes evidence of counsel’s explanation of the objectively-reasonable
strategic decision explaining counsel’s decision-making when their performance is alleged to
have been defective. The claim would have been reserved by motion for new trial resulting in
an evidentiary hearing for development of the record necessary for review by the appellate
court. See Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 507, 863 S.W.2d 813, 818 (1993).
305. It is not unlikely that the claims of ineffectiveness were raised for the first time in
the petition for review after the court of appeals declined to address claims on their merits
because trial counsel failed to preserve error, arguably demonstrating that the first prong of
the Strickland claim, defective performance by counsel, had been demonstrated by the appellate court’s refusal to address the claim on the merits.
306. Murphy, 1999 WL 1212876, at *1; see also Munn, 2005 WL 2462251, at *1.
307. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b). For the text of subsection (b), see supra note 223.
308. 2005 WL 2462251, at *1.
309. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 5-2(c). The Explanatory Note to this rule states that this version of
Rule 5-2 was effective as of July 1, 2009. The previous version of Rule 5-2(a) provided that
“[a]ll signed opinions of the Supreme Court shall be designated for publication.” In re Ark.
Supreme Court & Court of Appeals Rule 5-2, 2009 Ark. 330, at 3, 2009 Ark. Lexis 357, at
*4. The order in Munn was issued per curiam; the court did not issue a signed opinion, which
would have required publication affording the disposition precedential value. 2005 WL
2462251, at *1. In Luna-Holbird v. State, the court explained, “An [sic] unanimous opinion
of this court may be rendered as a Per Curiam opinion and not designated for publication at
the discretion of the court. Only those opinions of this court which are signed must be designated for publication.” 315 Ark. 735, 736, 871 S.W.2d 328, 329 (1994) (citing ARK. SUP. CT.
R. 5-2(a)).
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assistance of counsel is asserted as an issue, often the only issue perhaps,
raised in the Rule 37.1 petition.
A significant consequence of any continuing viability of the unpublished orders lies in whether the jurisdictional preclusion of ineffective
assistance claims from the Arkansas Supreme Court’s authority pursuant to
Rules 2-4 and 1-2(b) serves to finalize these claims in the Arkansas system
of review. If so, then a state court petitioner filing for federal habeas corpus
relief would have exhausted the state remedies available to him once the
court of appeals rules on the merits of his ineffective assistance claim. Because preclusion of ineffective assistance issues from the ambit of the supreme court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Rules 2-4 and 1-2(b) would
permit no further state court review of the claim raised in the Rule 37.1 action, the state court defendant petitioning for federal habeas relief would
have exhausted available remedies, affording the federal court jurisdiction to
consider the Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim on the merits.
There would be no failure to exhaust state remedies barring the federal court
from addressing the ineffectiveness issue because the highest court in the
state had not ruled on the claim.
Apart from the fact that Munn and Murphy are of dubious precedential
value due to the fact that they were issued as unpublished, per curiam orders, a second problem posed by their continuing viability lies in the fact
that the holding that ineffectiveness assistance claims are not cognizable in
Rule 2-4 petitions is simply incorrect. The Arkansas Supreme Court might
well overrule, or “retreat”310 from those dispositions rendered in unsigned
opinions, despite the fact that the two cases reflect the same approach over a
period of time, clearly representing the court’s position at that point. In doing so, the court might explain that redirection in the appeal from the denial
of Rule 37.1 relief requires the court to reconsider its prior understanding of
jurisdiction for purposes of Rule 2-4 petitions. Otherwise, the court might
foreclose review of appellate court decisions ordering relief on appeal from
the trial court, precluding the State from contesting cases in which the ineffective assistance claim is found to warrant relief.311
310. See, e.g., McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 921, 69 S.W.3d 430, 435 (2002) (emphasis
added) (for court’s use of the term “retreat,” in lieu of “overrule”: “The holding in Thompson
v. State, 284 Ark. 403, 682 S.W.2d 742 (1985) and its successors is in direct conflict with the
plain language of section 5-1-110. Accordingly, we retreat from those holdings to the extent
that they conflict with the statutory law.”).
311. Moreover, the range of potential relief accorded to the circuit court is broad and,
presumably, the court of appeals could either affirm an order granting relief, or order relief
from the same range of options in reversing the circuit court on appeal: “If the circuit court
finds that for any reason the petitioner is entitled to relief, then the circuit court may set aside
the original judgment, discharge the petitioner, resentence him or her, grant a new trial, or
otherwise correct the sentence, as may appear appropriate in the proceedings.” ARK. R. CRIM.
P. 37.4.
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But, as a substantive matter, Munn and Murphy simply got it wrong.
Claims of ineffective assistance are clearly recognized as arising from federal constitutional protections included in the Sixth Amendment.312 The application of the federal test for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of
counsel claims controls disposition of those claims for defendants in Arkansas state courts.313 Rule 1-2(b), which identifies those issues addressed on
direct appeal by the Arkansas Court of Appeals that may be considered in
the Rule 2-4 petition to the Arkansas Supreme Court for review of the appellate court’s disposition, expressly includes “issues involving federal constitutional interpretation.”314 This ground for review can hardly be distinguished from review that requires interpretation of Strickland and application of the Strickland standard for relief in assessing the ineffective assistance claim on the merits.
The federal habeas court’s authority to grant relief requires a showing
either that the state court erred in its interpretation or in its application of
United States Supreme Court precedent315 in addressing the state court defendant’s ineffective assistance claim.316 Justice O’Connor explained the

312. See, e.g., Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, at 4–5, 433 S.W.3d 234, 239 (2014); see
also Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 3–4, 403 S.W.3d 55, 58 (application of the federal
protection as the controlling definition of the right to effective assistance of counsel for Arkansas litigants); Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 51, 238 S.W.3d 24, 49 (2006) (Hannah, C.J.,
dissenting) (“Rule 37 petitions most often concern issues of alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel . . . .”).
313. See, e.g., Conley, 2014 Ark. 172, at 4–5, 433 S.W.3d at 39; see also discussion of
Strickland supra notes 160.
314. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b)(3).
315. The amended federal habeas statute, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, reflects the retroactivity approach adopted by the Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See, e.g., (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380–81 (2000) (“AEDPA has added, immediately following
the ‘clearly established law’ requirement, a clause limiting the area of relevant law to that
‘determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(1994 ed., Supp. III))); see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 296 (holding that only the Supreme
Court can adopt new rules of constitutional criminal procedure and determine whether they
will be applicable retroactively to cases in which the direct appeal process has been concluded and the conviction is final and reliance on newly announced rules is barred by the retroactivity doctrine).
316. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2018). The federal habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to
relief on a federal constitutional claim only by making one of two alternative showings. First,
the petitioner can prevail by showing that the state court judgment “resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”. Id. (emphasis added).
Alternatively, subsection (2) affords the habeas court authority to grant relief if the state
court’s determination “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. §
2254(d)(2) (emphasis added).
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effect of this provision in her concurring opinion in Williams v. Taylor,317
writing:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ
if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this
Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under
the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant
the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the
facts of the prisoner’s case.318

The developing law of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment illustrates the necessity for continuing state court involvement
in the interpretation of this class or category of federal constitutional claims
when addressed by state courts. The Court’s approach leaves factually novel
situations subject to review within the very general Strickland framework,
not limited to the Court’s previous applications of the holding to specific
fact complexes underlying the claims of defective performance and demanding the assessment of probable prejudice be based on the evidentiary record
presented in individual cases.
For example, in recent years the Court has applied the Strickland defective performance prong to counsel’s duty to properly advise the client of
potential deportation consequences following entry of a guilty plea,319 to
counsel’s mistaken explanation of applicable law leading the client to reject
a favorable plea offer,320 to counsel’s failure to convey a plea offer to the
client,321 and to counsel’s failure to accept the trial court’s offer of funds for
employment of a qualified expert witness.322 With regard to each variation
on the defective performance issue raised in state proceedings, the Supreme
Court of the United States ultimately applied Strickland to warrant relief
from counsel’s error in representing the petitioner convicted in state court.323
The holding in (Michael) Williams v. Taylor limits relief on this theory of state court error to
those facts actually developed in the state court proceedings. 529 U.S. 420, 440 (2000). This
ground precludes development of additional factual evidence in an evidentiary hearing in the
habeas court unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause on the part of the State to prevent
development of the factual record necessary to support his claim in the federal habeas process, under the test set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
317. (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13.
318. Id. at 412–13 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
319. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010).
320. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 167, 169 (2012).
321. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012).
322. Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014); see supra note 259.
323. Hinton, 571 U.S. at 274; Frye, 566 U.S. at 145; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169; Padilla, 559
U.S. at 368–69.
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These decisions demonstrate that continued interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance is warranted, even though
there may be little additional development of Strickland-based deficiency
issues.324 The court’s position in Munn and Murphy can hardly be consistent
with the broad authority for review under section 1-2(b)(3) since state courts
are obliged to at least consider arguments regarding interpretation of federal
constitutional protections, when those issues are raised in state proceedings.325
It would seem appropriate for the Arkansas Supreme Court to retreat
from its position in Munn and Murphy both because the redirection of the
Rule 37.1 appeal process would preserve the State’s right to seek review of
court of appeals’ decisions adverse to its position and reserve the role of
review of federal constitutional claims in Arkansas actions to the supreme
court. It is not altogether clear that the state supreme court is firmly committed to exercising its authority to interpret federal constitutional claims generally in the Rule 2-4 process.
2.

The Application of Rule 1-2(h) in Rule 37.1 Appeals

Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(h) provides:
In all appeals from criminal convictions or postconviction relief matters
heard in the Court of Appeals, the appellant shall not be required to petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals or review in the Supreme
Court following an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in order to
be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a
claim of error. When the claim has been presented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been denied, the appellant
shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies.326

The rule addresses the process of exhaustion in a direct way, in which
the Arkansas Supreme Court disavows any requirement that it provide for
review of constitutional claims that have been rejected by the court of appeals in the direct appeal or postconviction process. Initially, it is difficult to
reconcile its promulgation and adoption by the court in 2001, following the
324. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 952–55 (2010) (finding state court failed to
properly review ineffective assistance claim in terms of probable prejudice to accused in
remanding to state court for reconsideration).
325. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 n.8 (1983) (“The state courts are required
to apply federal constitutional standards, and they necessarily create a considerable body of
‘federal law’ in the process.”) (emphasis added); see Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1,
511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1.
326. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(h) (emphasis added). Subsection (h) was adopted by the state
supreme court in its order In re Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure 24.3 and 33.3; Supreme
Court Rule 1-2, 343 Ark. 872, 875 (Feb. 15, 2001) (per curiam).
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United States Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel,327 two years earlier in 1999. However, the Boerckel Court also
recognized by implication that some state appellate systems might apparently do more than simply discourage litigants from pursuing discretionary
relief in state supreme courts for review of adverse rulings on federal constitutional claims rendered by intermediate appellate courts.328
Rule 1-2(h) parallels the position taken by the South Carolina Supreme
Court in 1990,329 where that court explained its position on exhaustion:
We recognize that criminal and post-conviction relief litigants have routinely petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari upon the Court of Appeals’ denial of relief in order to exhaust all available state remedies. We
therefore declare that in all appeals from criminal convictions or postconviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for
rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of
Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been presented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been
denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state
remedies. This order shall become effective immediately. 330

The South Carolina court adopted this rule well before the Supreme Court of
the United States issued its decision in Boerckel nine years later and six
years before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,331 which includes strict statutory requirements for exhaustion of
state remedies.332
The Boerckel majority noted the South Carolina rule and, additionally,
an Arizona decision, State v. Sandon,333 in addressing the argument Boerckel
advanced that its holding would result in increased filing of unwanted peti-

327. 526 U.S. 838, 846 (1999).
328. Supra, note 288, and accompanying text. The majority noted: “In this regard, we
note that nothing in our decision today requires the exhaustion of any specific state remedy
when a State has provided that that remedy is unavailable.” 526 U.S. at 847.
329. In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal & Post-Conviction Relief Cases,
321 S.C. 563, 471 S.E.2d 454 (1990); see State v. Lyles, 381 S.C. 442, 443–44, 673 S.E.2d
811, 812–13 (2009) (affirming and applying exhaustion policy).
330. In re Exhaustion of State Remedies, 321 S.C. at 564, 471 S.E.2d at 454.
331. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
332. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2018). In subsection (c), the federal habeas statute expressly requires exhaustion of any state remedy available to assert a federal constitutional claim
“(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State
to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” Id. § 2254(c).
333. 777 P.2d 220 (Ariz. 1989).
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tions for discretionary review in the Illinois Supreme Court,334 arguably frustrating its usual rationale that federal review should respect state court decision-making as a matter of comity.335 While the South Carolina court’s position on exhaustion reflected an affirmative statement regarding the exhaustion process generally, the Arizona approach was the product of evolution.
Initially, the Arizona court had directed counsel not to file petitions for review in cases in which counsel had filed Anders briefs, concluding that the
appeal was without merit, or frivolous.336 But Sandon expanded upon its
rationale regarding the futility of petitioning for review in cases in which the
court of appeals had held, based on an Anders assessment that the appeal
was without merit. Sandon relied on State v. Shattuck,337 where the state
supreme court had considered, but rejected, availability of review following
disposition by the court of appeals based on its finding that the appeal was
without merit, or frivolous. The Shattuck court explained:
Since we are not required to accept petitions for review in Anders type
cases, we do not invite them. The system is strained to the point that we
cannot afford the luxury of repeated review of trivia or issues of small
merit. The time available to prosecutors, defenders, judicial staff and
judges must be devoted to issues of substance.338

It concluded: “Neither retained nor appointed counsel should seek review by
this court when the only issues that can be raised are without merit or frivolous.”339
In Sandon, the court expanded upon the Shattuck holding and held that
when the appellate had obtained a ruling on all issues presented on direct
appeal, further review was not required for exhaustion of state court remedies. It concluded that the same rule applied to cases not based on Anders
filings. Only limited circumstances warranted review of cases decided by
the court of appeals, such as newly discovered evidence of innocence or
undermining the finding of guilt or a change in law implicating the petitioner’s conviction of such significance that the rule should be applied retroactively.340 Thus, in Shattuck, the Arizona court had addressed the same issues
334. 526 U.S. at 847.
335. Comity may be defined as “[t]he legal principle that political entities (such as states,
nations, or courts from different jurisdictions) will mutually recognize each other’s legislative, executive, and judicial acts. The underlying notion is that different jurisdictions will
reciprocate each other’s judgments out of deference, mutuality, and respect.” Comity Definition, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comity (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
336. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 295 (2000).
337. 684 P.2d 154 (Ariz. 1984).
338. Id. at 157.
339. Id. at 158.
340. State v. Sandon, 777 P.2d 220, 221 (Ariz. 1989).
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of strained judicial resources prompting the Illinois court’s position in Rule
315(a).341
In adopting Rule 1-2(h), the Arkansas Supreme Court was unequivocal
in its position in light of Boerckel. The Reporter’s Notes to Rule 1-2(h)342
specifically address the state supreme court’s view. The Notes cite the
Court’s language from its decision relating to the “availability” of review
under state law in determining whether there were additional steps in the
exhaustion process that must be completed before a state petitioner could
seek federal review.343 The Notes conclude: “Petitions for review, which are
discretionary under subdivision (e) of this rule, should not be required in
order for a state prisoner to exhaust his state remedies.”344
The controlling issue in determining when state processes are essential
for exhaustion would appear to be whether the petitioner has a right to further review in state appellate process, or whether review is available only if
afforded by the state supreme court. The South Carolina rule and Arizona
decisions rest on the notion that if the petitioner only has the right to petition
for review rather than the right to review, the remedy is not “available” to
the petitioner. Rule 1-2(h) fits within this same analysis and is applicable to
Arkansas postconviction process with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Barnes, redirecting appellate jurisdiction in Rule 37.1 actions to the
Arkansas Court of Appeals instead of Rule 37.1 appeals traditionally being
filed and heard by the state supreme court. Thus, under the process ordered
in the Barnes footnote, the language in Rule 1-2(h) relating to postconviction proceedings raises the same question concerning the availability of the
341. 684 P.2d at 157.
342. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(h) note (holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States
were the reason for adding Subdivision h). The full text of the note provides:
Subdivision (h) was added in response to language in O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,
526 U.S. 838 [] (1999)(“[N]othing in our decision today requires the exhaustion
of any specific state remedy when a State has provided that that remedy is unavailable. Section 2254(c), in fact, directs federal courts to consider whether a habeas petitioner has ‘the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented,’. . . . The exhaustion doctrine, in other words,
turns on an inquiry into what procedures are ‘available’ under state law. In sum,
there is nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requiring federal courts to ignore a
state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available.”) Id., 526 U.S.
at 848. Petitions for review, which are discretionary under subdivision (e) of this
rule, should not be required in order for a state prisoner to exhaust his state remedies.
Id.
343. Id. (“The exhaustion doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry into what procedures are ‘available’ under state law. In sum, there is nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requiring federal courts to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not
available.” (quoting Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 838)).
344. Id.
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petition for review by the state supreme court in Arkansas cases as that formerly addressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court. The South Carolina
court was clear:
We therefore declare that in all appeals from criminal convictions or
post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition
for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of
Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been presented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been
denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state
remedies.345

Now, with the change in appellate jurisdiction over Rule 37.1 appeals, the
application of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(h) has become particularly
relevant, some eighteen years after its adoption by the supreme court.346
Reliance on Boerckel’s oblique reference to the South Carolina’s rule
to excuse the final step in Arkansas appellate process, the petition for review
pursuant to Rule 2-4, remains troublesome. The Supreme Court has not
clearly indicated that states may opt out of discretionary review by rule or
case law and neither the majority’s brief reference, nor Justice Souter’s explicit discussion, arguably stand for more than dicta. There are apparently no
decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit or
South Carolina federal district court formally excusing a federal habeas petitioner from the Boerckel requirement that discretionary review be denied
before the federal habeas action is ripe.
In State v. McKennedy,347 the South Carolina court confirmed its reliance on the court’s 1990 statement rejecting the petition for discretionary
review as a necessary step for exhaustion of state remedies.348 The McKennedy court relied on the explicit reference in Boerckel to the “ordinary appellate procedure . . . in the State”349 in response to the question: “What
remedies must a habeas petitioner invoke to satisfy the federal exhaustion
requirement?”350 It then explained that it had defined the discretionary review petition as “outside South Carolina’s standard review process.”351 In so
explaining, the court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the Arizona
approach to exhaustion of state remedies:
345. In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal & Post-Conviction Relief Cases,
321 S.C. 563, 564, 471 S.E.2d 454, 454 (1990).
346. See supra note 326 referring to adoption of Rule 1-2(h) by order of the Arkansas
Supreme Court in 1990.
347. 559 S.E.2d 850.
348. Id. at 854.
349. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847 (1999).
350. Id. at 842.
351. McKennedy, 559 S.E.2d at 854.
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Based on the Arizona statute and several Arizona opinions supporting
the statute, the Ninth Circuit held post-conviction review by the Arizona
Supreme Court to be a remedy that is “unavailable” within the meaning
of [Boerckel]. Honoring the Arizona statute, the Ninth Circuit held that
“claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal
habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.”352

In Swoopes v. Sublett,353 the Ninth Circuit considered the Arizona position on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsideration of its initial decision in light of Boerckel.354 The circuit court had initially held in an unpublished memorandum that Swoopes had failed to fully
exhaust all but one of his claims in the state courts before bringing the exhausted and unexhausted claims in his federal habeas action.355 The Ninth
Circuit had earlier ruled that a petitioner who had relief on Arizona precedent in not petitioning the state supreme court to review the adverse decision
by the state court of appeals rejecting his federal constitutional claims was
entitled to relief from the exhaustion requirement in the federal habeas statute because he had been misled by the state court interpretation of the role of
discretionary review for purposes of exhaustion of remedied.356 But
Swoopes had petitioned for review of one of his claims, relating to allegedly
tainted identifications by eye-witnesses and, as a consequence, the Circuit
Court initially concluded that he could not plead that he had been misled by
the state court’s exhaustion policy because he had, in fact, availed himself of
the discretionary review process with respect to the claimed tainted eyewitness testimony.357
On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States on Swoopes’s
petition for certiorari, the Ninth Circuit retreated from its position that he
had failed to properly exhaust because he could not rely on the argument
that he had been misled into not petitioning the state supreme court for review of the intermediate appellate court’s adverse rulings on his constitu-

352. Id. (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).
353. 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999).
354. Swoopes v. Sublett, 527 U.S. 1001 (1999).
355. Swoopes v. Sublett, No. 94-16033, 1998 WL 657711, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1998).
356. Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1462–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the petitioner had been misled by the Arizona Supreme Court’s approach to the exhaustion requirement imposed by the federal habeas statute). The Ninth Circuit noted that in Jennison v.
Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1311–12 (9th Cir. 1991), it had held that the Arizona exhaustion
doctrine was not consistent with the requirements for exhaustion under the federal habeas
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2018). Harmon, 959 F.2d at 1462–63. However, because Harmon had been misled by the Arizona precedent, the circuit court concluded that the rule for
procedural default for unexhausted claims, it excused his failure to exhaust by failing to petition for review. Id.
357. Swoopes, 1998 WL 657711, at *3.
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tional claims.358 Instead, it relied on Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in
Boerckel, in which he observed that the discretionary petition to a state supreme court could be seen as being “outside the standard review process”359
and not required for exhaustion of state remedies necessary for review of
constitutional claims on the merits in federal habeas proceedings.360 The
State then unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.361
Subsequently, the Arizona federal district court summarized the state of
Arizona exhaustion policy for purposes of federal habeas review in Crowell
v. Knowles,362 explaining:
Reviewing Arizona law, the court finds that the State has plainly removed discretionary supreme court review from the standard review
process for individuals sentenced to life in prison, and that Petitioner
therefore exhausted even though he did not timely utilize that procedure.
Contrary language in prior cases is both dictum and erroneous in its description of relevant Arizona statutes.363

What appears clear is that the exhaustion policies adopted by the South
Carolina and Arizona Supreme Courts have both served to satisfy federal
habeas courts that the petition for review by the state supreme court is not
required for exhaustion of federal constitutional claims that have been addressed and rejected by lower courts in those states. Instead, apparently relying on Justice Souter’s observation in Boerckel, those state supreme courts
have avoided the unnecessary filings for review that the majority did not
consider a sufficient basis to excuse discretionary review in the Illinois exhaustion process. Their policies on exhaustion, in contrast to the Illinois
Supreme Court’s strong suggestion to litigants that discretionary review will
almost always be futile, appear to have circumvented the majority’s usual
preference for the petitioner to exhaust any available remedy in order to
preserve a claim for federal review.
When the petitioner does not exhaust the federal constitutional claim to
be urged in the federal habeas petition by seeking discretionary review in a
state supreme court, the ninety-day period for petitioning for certiorari in the
358. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010–11.
359. 526 U.S. 838, 850 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
360. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010–11 (“In Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d
205 (Ariz. 1998) the Arizona Supreme Court considered certified questions from us, and
reiterated that a petition for review from the Arizona Court of Appeals is not part of a defendant’s right to appeal.”).
361. Swoopes, 196 F.3d 1008, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). Of course, the Court’s
decision to deny certiorari has no precedential value. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296
(1989).
362. 483 F.Supp.2d 925, 927 (D. Ariz. 2007).
363. Id. at 927.
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Supreme Court of the United States does not toll the one-year limitations
period for filing the federal petition. Instead, the one-year period for filing
the federal habeas petition, is tolled only by the time for filing for state discretionary review, as the Court clarified in Gonzales v. Thaler.364 For those
state court litigants who do not petition for review in the direct appeal process, the ninety-day filing period to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari does not toll the one-year period in which to file the
federal habeas corpus petition, as the Court explained.365 Importantly, the
ninety-day tolling period does not apply to petitioning for certiorari following denial of relief in state postconviction matters, as a matter of statutory
language.366
Arkansas petitioners who have failed to timely file for federal relief
within the one-year period of limitations for filing the habeas petition367
have argued that they were entitled to rely on the additional ninety days for
filing when the petitioner files for review by certiorari in the Supreme Court
of the United States.368 But neither the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals nor

364. 565 U.S. 134 (2012). The Court abrogated the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Riddle v.
Kemna, 523 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) where the circuit court had held that the oneyear habeas corpus filing period was tolled until the mandate of the state court issued. Gonzales, 565 U.S. at 139.
365. Gonzales, 565 U.S. at 150.
366. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333–34 (2007).
367. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2018) provides, in pertinent part:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if
the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
368. Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the time for filing the federal habeas petition is tolled while
a timely-filed certiorari petition is pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, which
the Court held, in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320 n.8 (1987). Thus, the minimal
ninety-day period for petitioning for certiorari tolls the one-year filing period while the certiorari remands pending. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (citing Smith v.
Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Bruton, 299 F.3d 981, 982 (8th
Cir. 2002). Then, in Gonzales v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 154 (2013) the Court held that the petition-
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Arkansas federal district courts have ruled that petitioners could rely on
Rule 1-2(h) to claim the additional ninety-day period for petitioning for certiorari following rejection of their federal constitutional claims by the Arkansas Court of Appeals to extend the one-year limitations for filing the
federal habeas petition without having exhausted the remedy of filing for
review under Rule 2-4.369 In Parmley v. Norris,370 the Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected reliance on Rule 1-2(h) as a basis for claiming that the one-year
period for petitioning for federal habeas corpus was tolled for the ninety
days permitted to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari.371 Parmley argued unsuccessfully that he could have properly petitioned
for certiorari following rejection of his federal constitutional claim by the
court of appeals without first petitioning for review in the Arkansas Supreme Court to exhaust review of the claim in the state appeal process.372
Since Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(h) is not specifically mentioned in Boerckel, it is not clear that application of the rule would be recognized along with the exception for the South Carolina and Arizona approaches noted by the Court in its opinion. In light of the fact that the court
did not include Rule 1-2(h) in its decision, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Parmley will foreclose reliance on the Rule by Arkansas petitioners to expand the one-year period for filing for federal habeas relief by the ninety
days that toll the filing to permit state court defendants to petition the Supreme Court of the United States by certiorari to review the rejection of federal constitutional claims by the court of appeals.
Without United States Supreme Court recognition that Rule 1-2(h) affords Arkansas Rule 37.1 litigants an alternative to the exhaustion of state
remedies through Rule 2-4, required by Boerckel, a postconviction petitioner
appealing denial of relief by the trial court must exhaust the petition for review process. Otherwise, they face dismissal of their claims on the merits
based on procedural default in failing to file for review pursuant to Rule 2-4.

er who did not seek discretionary review in the state system could not claim that the federal
habeas petition was timely based on the issuance of the state court’s mandate.
369. See Collier v. Norris, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1029–30 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (holding that
because petitioner’s claim was not cognizable for petition for review under Rule 2-4 based on
acceptable categories of claims under Rule 1-2(b), making the Arkansas Court of Appeals the
“highest court” upon which a decision could be had on the claim, but denying relief on the
merits), aff’d, 485 F.3d 415, 421, 426–27 (8th Cir. 2007); Ben-Yah v. Norris, 570 F.Supp.2d
1086, 1094 (E.D. Ark. 2008) (rejecting Collier’s conclusion that Arkansas Court of Appeals
was the “highest court” of the State as incorrectly reasoned).
370. 586 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2009).
371. Id. at 1070–71 (holding state court of appeals not “highest court” for purposes of
petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States for review by certiorari when claim not
presented in Rule 2-4 petition).
372. Id. at 1071–72.
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Arkansas petitioners who have not proceeded through Rule 2-4 seeking
review of claims they intend to assert in the federal habeas process will likely be required to respond to argument that these claims have not been
properly preserved in the state court exhaustion process. Although the habeas court might hold the petition in abeyance to permit the petitioner to return
to state court to explore exhaustion options,373 the time limits for filing the
Rule 2-4 review petition will have undoubtedly expired at that point. In this
scenario, the untimely filing in the Arkansas Supreme Court might result in
dismissal of the petition without a definitive statement that Rule 1-2(h) does
not require further exhaustion attempts under state law. A dismissal reinforcing Rule 1-2(h) as a controlling statement of Arkansas law might serve
to avoid application of the procedural default in the federal habeas process
but would also result in delay that could have been avoided by timely petitioning for review under Rule 2-4.
At the worst, however, a procedural morass could result, including
dismissal of the “unexhausted” claim by the habeas court based on a conclusion that dismissal of the Rule 2-4 petition as untimely, rather than mooted
by Rule 1-2(h), constituted procedural default of the federal claim. A clear
statement from the supreme court supporting application of Rule 1-2(h) to
explain the petitioner’s correct exhaustion of state remedies, arguably protecting the right to proceed in federal court without first petitioning for review. Without such a statement, the habeas court would likely find that it is
required to defer to the state court dismissal on untimeliness grounds and
conclude that this claim is procedurally defaulted. The “default” applied by
the state court would bar review on the merits of the claim by the federal
habeas court.374
Dismissal by the state supreme court for procedural default, however,
would contradict the clear intent its own Rule 1-2(h), in holding that such
claims would be treated as exhausted and would seem unlikely. But, in any
event, the delay in reaching a proper result recognizing the continuing viability of the rule could readily be avoided with the timely filing for review
pursuant to Rule 2-4. In the event this issue were to reach the supreme court
while a federal petition is being held in abeyance to permit exhaustion, the
court could extricate itself from further procedural skirmishes by issuing an
opinion including a statement affirming the court’s adherence to Rule 1-2(h)
and its underlying policy, such as the South Carolina Supreme Court did in
State v. McKennedy.375 Whether such affirmation would bind the federal
373. See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005); see also supra notes 272–73 and
accompanying text.
374. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
752–53 (1991); see also discussion of cases cited supra note 259.
375. 348 559 S.E.2d 850, 852 (S.C. 2002); see case cited and accompanying text supra
note 345.
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habeas courts in light of the holding in Gonzales v. Thaler,376 effectively
denying reliance on the ninety day filing period for petitioning the Court for
review by certiorari when the federal habeas petition failed to exhaust state
discretionary review proceedings, would be questionable. It is a question
that only the Supreme Court of the United States could answer authoritatively.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nothing in the Barnes footnote explains why the Arkansas Supreme
Court found it necessary to redirect primary appellate jurisdiction in Rule
37.1 appeals that included ineffective assistance of counsel claims from the
court to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, nor did the court offer clarification
of its newly-announced approach through a formal rule that would address
questions not answered with respect to the scope of its order by footnote,
even though the court has usually followed this approach,377 often after soliciting public and professional comment on the proposed change in a
rule.378
The unresolved questions raised by the court’s action in redirecting appellate jurisdiction in Rule 37.1 cases in which counsel’s effectiveness has
been challenged, a claim urging a Sixth Amendment violation that might
ultimately be resolved in the Supreme Court of the United States or federal
habeas courts, will likely be resolved over time. The resolution of the issues
not addressed by formal order that will eventually be decided by judicial
decisions, necessarily means that litigants and practitioners will have less
direction from the Arkansas Supreme Court than would be preferred in light
of the complexity of state and federal postconviction processes.379
376. See supra note 364. In Gonzales v. Thaler, the Court already abrogated the Eighth
Circuit Court holding that extended the one-year period for petitioning for federal habeas
review by the period of time during which the state appellate court mandate had not issued.
565 U.S. 134, 152–53 (2012), abrogating, Riddle v. Kemna, 523 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2008).
The Court held that the extended period of time was limited to the time for petitioning for
review, avoiding the administrative difficulties caused by referencing differing state procedures in the issuance of the mandate. Id.
377. E.g., ARK. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORD. No. 21 §§ 3 (2011), https://www.arcourts.gov/
print/198283 (imposing requirements for electronic filing of pleadings and briefs in state
courts); see Administrative Order, ARK. JUDICIARY, www.arcourts.gov/rules-andadministrative-orders/administrative-orders (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
378. See, e.g., In re Changes to Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 294 Ark. 674, 674–75,
742 S.W.2d 949, 949 (1988) (per curiam) (“The Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure
has submitted to us proposed changes in the rules of criminal procedure . . . . We invite comment upon the following changes, which will become effective on March 1, 1988 unless
altered or withdrawn by per curiam order prior to that date.”) (emphasis added).
379. At this point, there is apparently no decision rendered by the Arkansas Supreme
Court on a petition for review following a decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in an
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What is clear is that the directive in the Barnes footnote has been implemented to provide for initial appellate review of Rule 37 appeals not involving cases in which a death sentence or sentence of life imprisonment
has been imposed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals.380 What has not been
made clear is whether the petition for review will remain an integral and
necessary part of the Rule 37 appellate process, a critical issue with respect
to exhaustion of state remedies to permit review of federal constitutional
claims by the Supreme Court or federal habeas courts.
The Arkansas Supreme Court could, of course, decide to expedite the
process of informing petitioners and their attorneys, if represented by counsel, of the necessity for petitioning for review by Arkansas Supreme Court
Rule 2-4, of the viability of Supreme Court Rule 1-2(h), for instance, among
other unresolved questions noted in this article. Or, the court might simply
leave the questions to be addressed or answered on a case-by-case approach.

appeal from denial of Rule 37.1 relief by a state circuit court. In two recent decisions, for
instance, the supreme court ruled in Rule 37.1 appeals, but neither involved review of claims
that had been rejected by the court of appeals in a direct appeal from denial of relief by the
trial court. See Hinton v. State, 2019 Ark. 136, at 5, 2019 WL 1948729, at *2 (upholding
denial of relief on ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim); Reynolds v. State, 2019 Ark.
144, at 1, 2019 WL 2051786, at *1 (remanding for completion of the record). Hinton and
Reynolds were decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court in appeals arising from 37.1 proceedings in which the supreme court had decided the direct appeal in the case. Hinton, 2017 Ark.
107, 515 S.W.3d 121; Reynolds, 2016 Ark. 214, 492 S.W.3d 491. See ARK. SUP. CT. R. 12(a)(7) (providing that the supreme court has jurisdiction over “[s]econd or subsequent appeals following an appeal which has been decided in the Supreme Court.”).
380. See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 241, 519 S.W.3d 717 (decided April 17,
2017, some six weeks after the Barnes court changed the appellate jurisdiction of Rule 37
appeals effective March 2, 2017).

